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The dissertation investigates how supraliminal goal primes affect brand preference 
through explicit attitude and implicit attitude and whether the effect of supraliminal goal primes 
and/or mood on brand preference is mediated by cognitive load. Chapter 1 develops a conceptual 
framework and provides a theoretical background. Chapter 2 investigates how supraliminal goal 
primes and/or mood affect preference (Study 1), implicit attitude (Study 2) and explicit attitude 
(Study 3) in the context of luxury vs. frugal brand consumption. Chapter 2 also investigates 
whether the effect of goal primes and/or mood on preference is mediated by cognitive load. 
Chapter 3 considers whether, under a high cognitive load, the effect of goal prime and/or mood 










CHAPTER 1.   ESSAY ONE 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Studies suggest that subtle cues, (e.g., brand names, words associated with a certain goal) 
embedded in the environment, sometimes trigger an individual’s goal non-consciously, thus 
affecting his or her brand choice (Chartrand, Huber, Shiv, and Tanner, 2008). These subtle cues, 
often called primes, can affect choice by triggering goals, or by activating associated semantic 
representations through memory (Sela and Shiv, 2009). In priming goals, both Chartrand et al. 
(2008) and Sela and Shiv (2009) adapted a supraliminal priming method (Chartland and Bargh, 
1996) involving a scrambled sentence completion task. Although a series of studies by Bargh, as 
well as other researchers, successfully replicated the effect of goal priming on choice or other 
behavioral outcomes, other studies (e.g., Nelissen, Dijker, and Vries, 2005) suggested that goal 
priming affects choice only under certain conditions. Consistent with this notion, we argue that 
the effect of goal priming on consumer choice represents a complex process and should be 
moderated by factors such as cognitive load and consumer’s trait.       
Most of these studies investigate the relationship between goal priming and behavior or 
judgment. Yet, we do not have a clear understanding of how goal primes affect behavioral 
outcomes. Consistent with this notion, researchers call for further research on how goals are non-
consciously activated and might guide judgment and behavior (Custers and Aarts, 2007). 
Understanding this mechanism includes answering the following questions:  Does goal priming 
affect consumer preference with or without changing attitude toward certain objects? Are both 
explicit attitude and implicit attitude affected by goal priming? 
 Houwer and Moors (2007) suggested that “it would be interesting to see whether 
unconscious activation of goals through subliminal priming or scrambled sentence completion 
has an effect on implicit measures such as the IAT (Implicit Association Test).” Implicit 
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measures such as the IAT may be useful in understanding the process of how non-conscious goal 
activation affects behavioral outcomes. Building on the proposition, we may better capture the 
impact of goal priming by use of the Implicit Association Test. Understanding the effect of goal 
prime on implicit attitude is important, since as the relationship between goal and attitude is a 
relatively under-researched area (Freguson and Porter, 2009, p.447).   
In Chapter 1, we provide a theoretical framework for the effect of non-conscious goal 
activation on preference. In Chapter 2, we empirically investigate how a goal prime, cognitive 
load, and mood may affect preference (Study 1), implicit attitude (Study 2) and explicit attitude 
(Study 3). Finally, in Chapter 3, we empirically investigate how, under high cognitive load, goal 
primes and mood may affect implicit attitude and preference, simultaneously (Study 1) and 
explicit attitude and preference, simultaneously (Study 2). Please see Figure 1.1 for the General 















                                Manipulated Variables: Goal Prime, Mood, Cognitive Load 
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Figure 1.1 



















In other words, in Chapter 2, we study the effect of goal prime, cognitive load, and mood 
on each dependent variable (i.e., preference, implicit attitude, and explicit attitude) individually, 
in the context of consuming luxury and frugal brands. In Chapter 3, we study the effects of goal 
prime and mood on two pairs of dependent variables (i.e., implicit attitude and preference as well 
as explicit attitude and preference) simultaneously in the context of wholesome vs. decadent food 
brand consumption. Thus, the dissertation answers the following questions; (1) When does a 
supraliminal goal prime facilitate preference consistent with the goal prime? (2) Under what 
conditions do implicit attitudes mediate the relationship between the goal prime and preference? 
(3) Under what conditions do explicit attitudes mediate the relationship between the goal prime 
and preference? 
1.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.2.1. Defining Non-consciousness 
 A consumer may choose a brand automatically without much conscious thought. The 
selected brand may represent his/her favorite brand, or simply be chosen out of habit. 
Researchers use various terms to describe this kind of behavior, such as automatic choice, 
nonconscious choice, or unintentional choice. In order to provide specificity to these constructs, 
Bargh (1994) described the term automaticity from four aspects: unintentionality, unawareness, 
uncontrollability, and high efficiency. In this study, nonconsciousness means unawareness.  
More specifically, an individual can be nonconscious, or unaware of something, in three 
different ways (Vargas, 2008 and Chartrand, 2005). First, it refers to a situation where stimuli are 
presented for a brief period of time and an individual is not aware of the stimuli themselves (e.g., 
subliminal advertisement). Second, an individual is well aware of the stimulus, but is not aware 
of the automatic cognitive processes. Third, an individual may not be aware of the outcome (e.g., 
behavior) of the automatic processes.  
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1.2.2. Non-conscious Goal Pursuit 
A goal may be described as cognitive representation that is associated with a desired end 
state (Shah and Kruglanski, 2003; Kruglanski, et al 2002; Custers and Aarts, 2005). A goal is an 
important concept in understanding consumer behavior (Mitchell and Zhang, 2005). Goals affect 
attention (Pieters and Wedel, 2007), impression formation and memory processes (Chartrand and 
Bargh, 1996), categorization (Poynor and Haws, 2009), persuasion (Chang and Chou, 2008), 
brand evaluation (Labroo and Lee, 2006), and brand choice (Sela and Shiv, 2009). According to 
Osselaer et al (2005), consumers pursue three types of goals: (a) consumption goals, associated 
with consumption benefits such as a tasty and refreshing beverage; (b) criterion goals, associated 
with one’s standard for a satisfying choice, such as maximizing pleasure or explaining your 
choice to your family or friends; and (c) process goals, such as the avoidance of negative 
emotions. On one hand, consumers may pursue self-regulating goals, where one has to sacrifice 
short-term benefits (e.g., eating tasty food) over long-term benefits (e.g., staying fit). On the 
other hand, consumers may pursue indulgent or hedonic goals, where one may work too hard, 
thus, may force that consumer to take a trip to a Miami beach over a weekend.   
Researchers agree that goals can be activated, processed, and achieved not only 
consciously, but also non-consciously (e.g., Bargh, 1990). Consistent with this notion, goal 
systems theory suggests that there are two types of goals, a focal goal (i.e., a goal where one is 
aware of pursuit), and a background goal (i.e., a goal where one is not aware of the background 
presence) (Kruglanski et al 2002; Kim and Mitchell, 2008). Background goals reflect an 
automatic, non-conscious driver that may be explained by the Auto-Motive Model (Bargh, 1990).  
1.2.3. Goal and Mood 
People tend to approach positive stimuli and avoid negative stimuli. While positive 
stimuli may induce a positive mood, negative stimuli may induce a negative mood. Thus, an 
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individual learns that in a positive mood, it is acceptable to approach an object, but in a negative 
mood, it is better to avoid that object. That is why Fishbach and Labroo (2007) asserted that, 
similar to the mood as an information approach (e.g., Schwarz and Clore, 2003), people associate 
positive affect and approach tendency, as well as negative affect and avoidance tendency.  
Although an individual does not use mood as information, when he or she attributes mood to 
non-target objects (e.g., Schwarz and Clore, 2003), we believe that after non-conscious goal 
activation and a masked mood manipulation task, it is less likely that an individual consciously 
attributes his/her mood to an irrelevant object. In other words, in non-conscious goal activation, 
an individual is less likely to attribute his/her current mood to an object that is not in context. 
1.2.4. Explicit Attitude vs. Implicit Attitude 
Implicit attitudes are evaluations that are (a) based on an unknown origin, (b) 
automatically activated, and (c) result in uncontrollable outcomes (i.e., out of one’s control, 
either despite the individual’s intention to control, or simply because an individual does not view 
the outcome as originating from his/her attitude and does not intend to control it) (Greenwald 
and Banaji, 1995, Wilson, Lindsey and Schooler, 2000). While explicit attitudes are influenced 
by conscious processing, such as conscious adjustment, implicit attitudes are believed to be 
influenced by unconscious processing (Perkins, Forehand, Greenwald, and Maison, 2008, p. 464). 
Thus, researchers find dissociations between explicit attitudes (e.g., self-reported attitude 
measures) and implicit attitudes (e.g., indirect attitude measures).    
Explicit attitude measures and implicit attitude measures are sometimes highly correlated 
and other times completely unrelated (Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le and Schmitt, 
2005). Thus, some studies assert that the extent of association between explicit attitude and 
implicit attitude depends on several factors that include (a) self-presentation, (b) evaluative 
strength, and (c) dimensionality. According to Nosek (2005), first, when one’s self-presentation 
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concern is high, explicit attitude may be altered in order for others in society to better accept the 
response of the individual, while implicit attitude should be free from any deliberate alteration of 
attitude. Thus, a high self-presentation concern should result in low implicit and explicit attitude 
correspondence. Second, a personally important and familiar evaluation (i.e., high evaluative 
strength) should result in a stronger association between implicit and explicit attitude, than a 
personally unimportant, unfamiliar evaluation. Third, for those concepts that fit a bipolar 
structure, an individual should find it relatively easier to retrieve (i.e., an almost automatic 
retrieval) and form an evaluation, than for those with unipolar structure. Thus, a simple, bipolar 
structure of concepts should result in a stronger association between explicit and implicit attitude, 
than those with a unipolar structure of concepts. 
1.2.5. Explicit vs. Implicit Attitude as Predictor of Food Preference   
  
Researchers have studied the predictive ability of the IAT compared to explicit attitude 
measures, regarding food choices with mixed empirical results. Karpinski and Hilton (2001) 
found no correlation between IAT and explicit attitude measures towards snacks versus fruits. In 
the study, where explicit attitude measures predicted behavior (i.e., an actual choice between a 
Snickers candy bar and a Red Delicious Apple), the IAT did not predict behavior.  
Similarly, Perugini (2005) studied preferences for snacks versus fruit. In the study, the 
IAT successfully predicted “spontaneous” behavior (i.e., actual choice between snacks and fruit). 
Then, explicit attitude predicted “deliberative” behavior, using self-reported measures, such as 
“[T]o what extent would you describe yourself as a person who regularly eats snacks (fruits)?” 
The correlation between explicit attitude measures and the IAT was not significant (r = .09).   
Roefs and Jansen (2002) studied implicit and explicit attitude towards high-fat vs. low-fat 
foods. Interestingly, the finding noted that obese people carry a negative, implicit attitude 
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towards high-fat food. Thus, while obese people like the taste of high-fat foods and tend to eat 
those foods frequently, they tend to carry a negative, implicit attitude toward these high-fat foods. 
More recently, Craeynest et al. (2008) studied attitude changes towards food and exercise 
among young, obese people, who successfully lost weight. The study tested whether an implicit 
attitude or an explicit attitude toward food and exercise changed before and after the weight loss. 
The study found no major attitude change, either explicit or implicit, to explain the successful 
weight loss. Thus, researchers find mixed results in terms of whether explicit and implicit 
attitude are correlated, and whether explicit and implicit attitudes predict preference and choice 
behavior differently.     
1.2.6. Semantic Activation vs. Goal Activation 
Dijksterhuis and Bargh (2001) investigated whether priming leads to semantic activation 
or goal activation. The researchers assumed that, whereas semantic activation decays after a 
delay (e.g., 5 minutes), goal activation increases overtime, until the goal is attained. The study 
found that the effect of priming on a perception-related task, which should be mediated by 
semantic activation, disappeared after a five-minute delay. Then, the effect of priming on a 
behavior-related task, mediated by goal activation, increased after a five-minute delay.  
This view is consistent with the activation-striving model (Sela and Shiv, 2009), which 
proposes that the effect of primes on behavior diminishes over time when mediated by semantic 
activation, given trait-consistent primes.  On the other hand, whereas the effect of primes on 
behavior persists over time when a goal is activated, given trait-inconsistent primes.  In other 
words, semantic activation is enhanced by trait-consistent primes, whereas goal activation is 
facilitated by trait-inconsistent primes (e.g., Sela and Shiv, 2009). The former may be explained 
by the self-schema matching paradigm (Markus and Wurf, 1987). According to the paradigm, an 
individual pays more attention, processes with greater intensity, and favors trait-consistent 
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information. This greater intensity in processing trait-consistent information than self-
inconsistent information leads to semantic activation.  
Conversely, trait-inconsistent primes tend to highlight the gap between one’s current state 
and ideal state, when the primes are perceived as positive and desired. As previously reviewed, 
this approach tendency for positive stimuli in achieving the goal may be extended to an approach 
tendency, when an individual is in a positive mood.  This approach tendency for positive stimuli 
or for an individual in a positive mood should be observed for goal-activation, rather than for 
semantic activation.  
1.2.7. Goals and Attitudes 
Fiske (1992) asserts that an individual’s goal shapes not only how he or she acts to 
achieve his or her goal, but also how he or she thinks. Apart from the view that considers 
cognition and motivation to be two separate systems, Fiske’s (1992) argument is consistent with 
the theory of goal systems, where motivation is viewed as part of cognition (Kruglanski et al., 
2002). This perspective is a theoretical foundation of the relationship between goals and attitudes.   
Ferguson and Bargh (2004) found that pursuit of a certain goal affects the automatic 
evaluation of an object that is strongly linked with the goal in memory, but does not affect 
explicit attitude (See also Ferguson and Porter, 2009, pp. 465-466, for a recent review on this 
topic).  As an individual’s goal is activated, the accessibility of that goal and a goal-relevant 
object useful to achieve that goal should increase (Kruglanski et al., 2002). This increased 
accessibility of the goal-relevant object should result in a more positive evaluation of that object. 
Ferguson and Bargh (2004) argued that an individual can efficiently assess the valence of the 
attitude object efficiently, with automatic evaluation alone. This positive automatic evaluation of 
the goal-relevant object should increase the approach tendency of the goal, thereby encouraging 
the goal-consistent behavior. 
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Recently, Ferguson (2008) replicated the effect of goal activation on an implicit attitude 
in the context of non-conscious goal activation. In the studies, after completion of a scrambled 
sentence task, participants evaluated the valence of subliminally presented objects, with some 
goal-relevant, while others were goal-irrelevant. As these attitudes were generated with no 
awareness toward those targets, these evaluations were considered to be implicit attitudes.    
1.3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
1.3.1. Auto-Motive Model 
The Auto-Motive Model (Bargh, 1990) suggested that goals may be activated 
automatically and may affect processing and behavior outside of one’s consciousness. According 
to the model, situational cues can activate goals automatically in three ways. First, general 
situational features of a common event may activate associated goals and motives. For instance, 
when an individual encounters situational features of a common event (e.g., a restaurant), he or 
she may pre-consciously activate associated goals and motives (e.g., eating at a restaurant). 
These situational features of common events that take place frequently in one’s daily life are 
often linked to a single representation (e.g., associated goal and motive). Kahneman (1973) 
mentions the possibility of non-conscious control in constructing responses for simple tasks. 
Kahneman (1973) argues that an individual can form a response to a simple task without 
interpreting the meaning of selected objects. Second, situational cues can automatically activate 
social or cultural norms. Then, once triggered, these norms activate associated goals and 
intentions, thus leading to behavior considered to be a norm in the society or culture. Third, an 
individual may perceive the goals of other people, which may trigger the goal of the individual 
(i.e., a reactive goal). The third process of automatic goal activation differs from the first two 
processes in that behavioral features, not situational features, trigger the activation process. 
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Bargh (1990, p. 103) noted that other researchers, such as Norman and Shallice (1986), 
also developed a model to explain the links between goals and environmental cues. The model of 
Norman and Shallice (1986) indicates how some behaviors may become automatic as a result of 
frequent learning processes, thereby needing little attention or intention (e.g., a bus driver 
becomes so accustomed to pulling over at a bus stop that he non-consciously repeats the action 
when he or she drives the family car).  
Instead, the auto-motive model suggests that higher-order goals or motivational 
properties themselves can be automatically activated to guide actions.  The auto-motive model 
assumes that situational cues can automatically trigger one’s goal, which in turn activates 
associated plans and intentions that lead to certain behaviors. Bargh (1990) argued that this 
process can happen without an individual’s consciousness. In other words, an individual may not 
be aware that his or her perception, judgment, and behavior are affected by automatically 
triggered goals. Thus, whereas Norman and Shallice’s (1986) model suggested that 
environmental cues can trigger well-learned automatic behavior without attention or intention, 
the auto-motive model suggests that environmental cues can activate a goal or intention, to guide 
actions. Bargh and Pratto (1986) claimed that these environmental cues affect people’s cognitive 
processes, regardless of their intentions. Similarly, Moskowitz, Li, and Kirk (2004) discussed the 
possibility of a non-conscious goal-pursuit, despite a conscious withdrawal from pursuing the 
goal (i.e., implicit volition).  
1.3.2 Dual Process Models 
1.3.2.1 MODE Model 
Attitude may be defined as an “association in memory between an object and one’s 
evaluation of it (Olson and Fazio, 2009: Fazio, 2007).” The motivation and opportunity as 
determinants (MODE) model assumes the existence of two types of attitude-to-behavior 
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processes: a spontaneous, attitude-behavior process that involves “a spontaneous reaction to 
one’s perception of the immediate situation,” as well as deliberate, attitude-behavior processes 
that involve “deliberation regarding the behavioral alternatives.” The model attempts to integrate 
two different models of attitudes: one that deals with automatic attitude-behavior processes (e.g., 
Fazio, 1986), and another that assumes deliberative attitude-behavior processes (e.g., theory of 
reasoned action by Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980). The MODE model offers insights on how attitude 
guides behavior by incorporating motivation and opportunity as two moderators of attitude-
behavior processes. According to the MODE Model, when people have neither the opportunity 
nor motivation to foresee the consequences of their actions, automatically activated attitudes will 
guide their behaviors (Fazio, 1990; Gibson, 2008). In other words, only when sufficient 
opportunity and motivation are available, does an individual engage in deliberative processes. 
The MODE model distinguishes itself from other attitude models such as elaboration 
likelihood model (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) or heuristic-systematic model (Chaiken, Liberman, 
and Eagly, 1989), by employing a relatively broad definition of opportunity and motivation. In 
the MODE model, opportunity refers to the availability of various resources to process 
information, such as time and other cognitive factors; motivation refers to the level of effort an 
individual makes in order to reach a conclusion that affects behaviors and judgments, regardless 
of the conclusion. For instance, an individual may want to make the right decision or want 
his/her behavior to be accepted by a society. Unlike other attitude models that consider the level 
of accuracy to be the main motivational factor, the MODE model considers all efforts to be 
motivational factors.  
Thus, the MODE model assumes four different situations, determined by the level of 
opportunity and motivation. As drawn in Figure 1.2, these four situations are (a) low motivation 
and low opportunity, (b) low motivation and high opportunity, (c) high motivation and low 
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opportunity, and (d) high motivation and high opportunity (Please see Figure 1.2 and also see 
Olson and Fazio (2009) for a comprehensive review). According to the model, motivation allows 
for the possibility of deliberative attitude-behavior processes; opportunity serves as a gate that 
determines whether the deliberative process initiated by high motivation affects judgment or 
behavior. Low opportunity (e.g., an individual does not have enough time to make a choice) 
closes the path of this deliberative process, such that automatically activated attitudes will guide 
judgment or behavior (high motivation and low opportunity condition). However, high 
opportunity allows the deliberative process initiated by high motivation to affect judgment and 
behavior (high motivation and high opportunity condition). When motivation is low, an 
automatically activated attitude guides behavior and judgment, regardless of the opportunity (low 
motivation and low opportunity condition or low motivation and high opportunity condition).  











                                                                        Adapted from Olson and Fazio, 2009 
Figure 1.2 
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1.3.2.2 Recent Dual Process Model 
Recently, Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006) introduced the unconscious thought theory, 
proposing two types of thoughts, conscious and unconscious. The researchers  defined conscious 
thought as “object-relevant or task-relevant cognitive or affective thought processes that occur 
while the object or task is the focus of one’s conscious attention,” and unconscious thought as 
“object-relevant or task-relevant cognitive or affective thought processes that occur while 
conscious attention is directed elsewhere.” The theory proposes that the following three 
principles, among others, determine the relative applicability of either conscious thought or 
unconscious thought in constructing outcomes (e.g., making decisions). The capacity principle 
states that unconscious thought enjoys a large capacity, thus allowing more information to be 
considered, whereas conscious thought suffers from low capacity constraints. The weighting 
principle states that unconscious thought typically employs consistent weighting, leading to a 
satisfactory choice, whereas conscious thought suffers from noise in weighting, often resulting in 
relatively low satisfaction for one’s choice. The rule principle states that conscious thought is 
better at precisely following rules than unconscious thought, which follows a rule roughly (e.g., 
only capable of giving rough estimates for a certain calculation).                  
1.3.3. Mood as Information Model 
Schwarz (1990) proposed that an individual use one’s affective state as a source of 
information in evaluating an object, by asking “how do I feel about it?” According to the model, 
a positive, affective state informs an individual that he or she is in a safe environment, while a 
negative, affective state alerts an individual that he or she is in a problematic environment. 
Sometimes, an individual misattributes a feeling to be a response toward a given object; this 
results in a more favorable response in a positive, affective state, rather than in a negative, 
affective state. Unlike other models (e.g., affect infusion model by Forgas (1995)), this 
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attribution can happen beyond one’s consciousness (Schwarz and Clore 2003). The “how do I 
feel about it?” heuristic simplifies judgment, because he or she can evaluate the object without 
evaluating the detailed features of the given object. Thus, in a situation where one’s cognitive 
capacity is limited (e.g., under time pressure, or the complex judgment task), an individual may 
rely more on his or her affective state to construct an evaluation toward an object (Schwarz, 
1990).     
However, an individual may not use his or her affective state to evaluate an object, when 
his or her current affective state is irrelevant to the given object (Schwarz and Clore 2003). For 
instance, when a person is aware that a previous event has induced the current affective state, the 
individual may realize that the object was irrelevant and therefore did not affect his or her current 
affective state, in which case the affective state would not influence the evaluation of the object.         
1.3.4 Self-Schema Matching Paradigm 
A self-schema is a generalized view of the self and is derived from one’s prior experience 
and stored in memory (Markus and Wurf, 1987).  A self-schema is believed to affect one’s 
attention, encoding, and retrieval of the information used to guide one’s behavior (Wheeler, Petty, 
and Bizer, 2005; Markus and Wurf, 1987).  For instance, based on past social experiences (e.g., 
interaction with other people), an individual may consider himself/herself an introvert or an 
extrovert. For example, a self-concept as an introvert may lead an individual to decline an 
invitation to a party, because the schema facilitates the prediction that he or she would be 
uncomfortable at the party when interacting with other people.  
The self-schema matching paradigm suggests that an individual favors a message or a 
product that is consistent with his or her self-schema (Wheeler et al. 2005). Cacioppo, Petty, and 
Sidera (1982) found that an individual has a favorable attitude toward a message that is relevant 
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to his/her self-schema, when compared to another, equally persuasive, message less relevant to 
his/her self-schema.   
1.3.5. Theory of Goal Systems 
Some researchers (e.g., Bem, 1972) viewed motivation and cognition as two separate 
systems. For instance, the self-perception theory (Bem 1972), asserts that individuals come to 
understand their own attitudes through observing themselves. Thus, the self-perception theory 
explains an attitude change from a cognitive perspective. However, other explanations of attitude 
change employ a motivational approach, such as cognitive dissonance theory. When motivation 
and cognition are considered to be two separate systems, motivation is thought to select the mode 
of persuasion. For example, one system requires more effort (e.g., a central route) and the other 
system requires less effort, relying on heuristic cues (e.g., a peripheral route) (See Kruglanski et 
al. 2002 for review).  
In contrast, the theory of goal systems proposes that motivation and cognition are not 
separate systems. That is, the motivational process consists of cognitive properties that partly 
determine which goal concepts are triggered (Kruglanski et al. 2002). Thus, the theory explains 
goal concepts as “knowledge structures governed by cognitive principles” (Kruglanski et al. 
2005). In other words, the theory assumes that the motivational process can be a less effortful, 
automatic, and dynamic process rather than a static, effortful process. For instance, people may 
shift their attentions from one task (e.g., writing a paper) to another (e.g., checking e-mail), and 
another (e.g., going to a refrigerator to find a snack); each task can be considered a motivational 
phenomena with its own goal (e.g., getting a publication, communicating with someone, and 
fulfilling one’s hunger, respectively). Kruglanski et al. (2002) claimed that if motivation is 
considered a part of a cognitive system, we should be able to better understand this dynamic 
process. In cognitive systems, one cue may activate another cue (e.g., associative network 
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model). As a result, the theory explains goal systems as networks of mental representations, 
where goals and means are cognitively associated with one another. In other words, the theory 
considers goals and means to be mental representations in an associative network, which may be 
activated. Although the theory of goal systems (Kruglanski et al. 2005) distinguishes goal 
activation from semantic activation, thus suggesting that goals are triggered by the “active 
pursuit of goals via particular means,” other researchers noted conversely that semantic 
associations between goals and means are thought to be passive and without motivational 
properties (c.f., Sela and Shiv, 2009).    
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CHAPTER 2.  ESSAY TWO 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 2, we investigate when supraliminal goal priming facilitates a goal consistent 
(inconsistent) preference, through analyzing possible moderators such as traits (i.e., materialism) 
and cognitive load (Study 1). Then, prior to testing the mediating roles of implicit attitude and 
explicit attitude in Chapter 3, we study whether the goal primes and mood effect implicit attitude 
(Study 2) and explicit attitude (Study 3) by applying the same potential moderators of 
materialism and cognitive load.  
These studies will be tested in frugal and luxury brand consumption contexts. Even 
during the present recession, many consumers have difficulty controlling their spending.  
Sherman (2009) noted that on the average, Americans spend more than they earn. Yet, frugality, 
a consumer trait, was neglected in scholarly consumer behavior literature (Lastovicka, 
Bettencourt, Hughner, and Kuntze, 1999). Lastovicka et al. (1999) defined frugality as a 
consumer lifestyle characteristic, associated with future goal orientation, in practicing restraint in 
acquiring and consuming economic goods and services. Frugality seems critical for societal well-
being by reducing consumers who are in debt. Yet, wealthy consumers remain conservative on 
their spending behaviors, while global sales of luxury goods declined by 7% in 2009. Thus, the 
promotion of luxury and indulgent goals for wealthy consumers becomes critical in stimulating 
today’s economy. 
How might we promote goals that are sometimes inconsistent with consumers’ lifestyle 
or traits? The idea of non-conscious goal pursuit provides a possible solution. Bargh (1990) 
argued that a certain environmental cue activates an individual’s goal, triggering both intentions 
and plans, and facilitating goal-consistent behavior, all of which happens beyond an individual’s 
consciousness. The entire process can happen non-consciously, regardless of a conscious 
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intention. Thus, despite consumer intention, we promote frugal spending behavior toward those 
consumers who have a tendency to over-spend, as well as promote indulgent spending behavior 
towards wealthy consumers, who psychologically minimize spending during the economic turn-
down.   
2.2. CONSTRUCT DEFINITIONS 
2.2.1. Goal Prime 
A goal prime is associated with the non-conscious activation of a cognitive structure, 
inclusive of the ideal state that an individual may wish to achieve, and a means to reach that state, 
with associated information (Laran, Jeniszewski, and Cunha Jr., 2008, Kruglanski et al. 2002, 
Shah and Kruglanski, 2003; Custers and Aarts, 2005). The study employed two types of goal 
primes: a luxury or a frugal goal prime. A frugal goal mirrors consumer lifestyle characteristics, 
associated with future goal orientation, to produce restraint in acquiring and consuming 
economic goods and services (Lastovicka et al, 1999). Conversely, a luxury goal is associated 
with a materialistic, consumer lifestyle, where owning material goods is considered a crucial life 
objective (Richins, 2004; Richins and Dawson, 1992).    
2.2.2. Mood 
 Mood is a relatively long-lasting, general affective state that targets no specific referent 
(Linnenbrink and Pintrich, 2004, p.58). This study examines two types of mood, based on 
valence – a positive mood vs. a negative mood. A positive mood includes such affective states as 
happy, pleased, and satisfied. A negative mood includes such affective states as unhappy, sad, or 
nervous (see Watson and Tellegen, 1985, for a detailed description of mood structure).    
2.2.3. Cognitive Load 
Cognitive load is associated with the use of working memory, where task related 
information is maintained while conducting a certain task (Shah and Miyake, 1999). 
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2.2.4. Implicit Attitude 
Implicit attitudes are evaluations that are (a) formed from an origin of which an 
individual is not aware, (b) automatically activated, and (c) results in uncontrollable outcomes 
(Greenwald and Banaji, 1995, Wilson, Lindsey and Schooler, 2000). 
2.2.5. Explicit Attitude 
An explicit attitude may be defined as conscious evaluative judgments about a certain 
object with a known origin (Gawronski and Bodenhausen, 2006).   
2.2.6. Preference 
 Preference represents the degree that an individual likes one alternative more than 
another (Merriam-Webster, 2010). Whereas choice is discrete (e.g., a choice of one brand over 
another), preference is associated with the extent to which an individual likes one brand more 
than another brand.        
2.2.7. Materialism 
Materialism is associated with a consumer lifestyle, where owning material goods may be 
considered a crucial life objective (Richins, 2004; Richins and Dawson, 1992).    
2.2.8. Category Combination 
In this study, a category combination refers to alternative combinations of categories in 
the Implicit Association Test. One may combine luxury and positive (on the left) and frugal and 
negative (on the right) in Blocks 3 & 4, and then frugal and positive (on the left) and luxury and 
negative (on the right) in Blocks 6 & 7 for combination 1. Another alternative is to combine 
frugal and positive (on the left) and luxury and negative (on the right) in Blocks 3 & 4, and then 
luxury and positive (on the left) and frugal and negative (on the right) in Blocks 6 & 7 for 





2.3.1. Study 1: Effect of Goal on Preference 
2.3.1.1. Hypothesis 1 (Effect of Goal on Brand Preference in High Load Condition) 
The automotive model (Bargh, 1990) suggested that environmental features not only 
activate people’s goals, but guide people’s cognition and behavior without their awareness.  The 
model suggests that associative links are created in memory between goals and related 
environmental features, following frequent and consistent association between the two.  That is 
why the activation of environmental cues can automatically activate relevant goals, intentions, 
and plans. Since what one attempts to achieve may guide how one sees, thinks about, and acts on 
goal-relevant objects, research finds that goals often determine perception, cognition, and 
behavior (Bargh, 1990, Neisser, 1967).  Thus, a supraliminal goal prime should first activate 
relevant goals (frugal or luxury) and thereby guide preferences to frugal or luxury brands. Prime 
words  associated with either frugal or luxury goals should activate related concepts, eventually 
leading to higher order goals. As the accessibility of the goals frugal/luxury) increases, the 
preference for frugal or luxury brands should increase, resulting in a goal of prime-consistent 
preference (Please see Figure 2.1). 
The MODE model suggests that when an individual has little opportunity, an individual 
is more likely to follow an automatic attitude-behavior process, regardless of motivation.  Thus, 
when the availability of cognitive resources is limited (i.e., a high cognitive load condition), an 
individual tends to follow automatic attitude-behavior processes. The term, cognitive resources, 
represents the availability of a working memory. Working memory refers to a system where 
task-related information is maintained while conducting a cognitive task (Shah and Miyake, 
1999). In order to perform a certain task, working memory requires a certain amount of resource, 
which is associated with cognitive load (Barrouillet, Bernardin, Portrat, Vergauwe, and Camos 
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2007). Therefore, an automatically activated goal may guide one’s brand preference, when the 
availability of cognitive resources is limited. Thus, 
H1: Under a high cognitive load, consumers prefer brands consistent with the goal prime, 
regardless of consumer materialism. 
 
Figure 2.1 
PREDICTION FOR H1 
 
2.3.1.2. Hypothesis 2 (Effect of Goal on Brand Preference in Low Load Condition)  
 The MODE model suggests that under a high opportunity condition (i.e., a low cognitive 
load), an individual tends to take deliberative processes when that individual has a high 
motivation. Thus, under a low cognitive load, an individual should take deliberative processes 
when he or she has a high materialism. For an individual with higher materialism, the 
consequence of brand preference between a frugal and a luxury brand should become more 
important than for those with less materialism. Thus, a person with high materialism should have 
a higher motivation than one with low materialism. In such a deliberative process, the goal prime 
should not affect preference. Please see Figure 2.2. for prediction. The MODE model also 
suggests that under a high opportunity condition (i.e., low cognitive load), an individual tends to 
22 
 
take relatively automatic processes, when an individual has low motivation (e.g., less 
materialism). The goal prime should affect preference under automatic processing, rather than 
under deliberative processing. Thus, under high opportunity (i.e., a load cognitive load) and low 
motivation (i.e., a low materialism), an automatically activated goal should guide choice, 
resulting in a preference consistent with the goal prime. Therefore, 
 H2. Under a low cognitive load, (a) consumers low in materialism prefer brands 
consistent with the goal prime, whereas (b) brand preference is unaffected by the goal prime for 
consumers high in materialism. 
 
Figure 2.2   
PREDICTION FOR H2 
 
2.3.1.3. Hypothesis 3 (Semantic-cue activation vs. Goal Activation Explanations) 
The preference task in the study is hypothetical and not an actual choice. Thus, when the 
prime (luxury vs. frugal) is successfully priming a goal, an individual’s gap between the ideal 
state and the current state should remain the same with no satiation effect. Merely preferring one 
luxury brand to another frugal brand does not help an individual to achieve a luxury goal. 
However, when the goal prime is activating prime-related cues in associative networks, rather 
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than as a goal, the trend for prime-consistent preference should diminish over time, due to a 
decay of prime-related cues within associative networks.  
Thus, we have two competing explanations for the effect of goal prime on preference. If 
the goal prime is actually activating a goal, the effect of the prime should not be affected by 
repeated preference measures.  Alternatively, if the prime is activating prime-related semantic 
cues, the effect of the goal prime should diminish over time, thus the effect of the prime should 
be affected by repeated preference measures (Please see Figure 2.3 for prediction). Thus, the two 
competing hypotheses are;  
H3: Under a high cognitive load, consumers prefer brands consistent with the goal prime, 
such that (a, goal activation explanation) the effect is unaffected by repeated preference 
measures over time, or (b, semantic-cue activation explanation) the effect diminishes 
with repeated preference measures over time.    
Figure 2.3   
PREDICTION FOR H3 
 
2.3.1.4. Hypothesis 4 (Effects of Mood on Preference) 
Studies suggest that an individual in a negative mood often lacks self-control, and 
abandons healthy behavior or frugal spending behavior, as negative moods induce self-defeating 
motivations (Tice, Bratslavsky, and Baumeister, 2001). Leith and Baumeister (1996) suggested 
that this is because individuals in negative moods tend to take riskier behaviors than those in 
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positive moods, hoping for a significant, immediate outcome (e.g., eating unhealthy, tasty food, 
hoping to improve one’s mood), but often resulting in a costly, long-term outcome (e.g., 
becoming unhealthy).  
Thus, an individual in a negative mood, as a result of a lack of self-control, may prefer 
luxury brands to frugal brands, more than an individual in a positive mood (Please see Figure 2.4 
for prediction). This is because an individual in a negative mood, instead of a positive mood, 
often fails to resist the temptation of immediate rewards (i.e., feeling better by purchasing luxury 
brands, rather than frugal brands) and thereby sacrifices the long-term benefit (i.e., saving money 
by purchasing frugal brands, instead of luxury brands).  
 
Figure 2.4 
PREDICTION FOR H4 
 
Muraven and Baumeister (2000) asserted that self-control consumes personal resources 
and an individual can control only a limited number of behaviors simultaneously. When a 
negative mood impairs one’s ability to self-control, such resources may be partially used, leaving 
less available resources for self-control. Since cognitive load may use similar resources, an 
individual under high cognitive load may have less cognitive resources for self-control, than an 
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individual under low cognitive load. Thus, the effect of a negative mood on impairment of self-
control may be more pronounced for an individual under high cognitive load than for an 
individual under low cognitive load. Therefore, we have the following predictions;                  
H4: (a) As mood decreases (more negative), a preference for luxury brands increases; (b) 
this effect is more pronounced under high cognitive load than under low cognitive load. 
2.3.2. Study 2: Effect of Goal on Implicit Attitude 
2.3.2.1. Hypotheses 5 & 6 (Cognitive Load and Goal Prime on Implicit Attitude)  
The MODE model suggests that under low opportunity (e.g., limited cognitive resources 
under high cognitive load), an individual’s behavior or judgment tends to be automatic (Olson 
and Fazio, 2009, p. 45). In such cases, an individual’s preference should be significantly affected 
by non-conscious goal primes. Ferguson (2008) suggested that goal activation affects implicit 
attitude, yet does not affect explicit attitude. Thus, a goal prime should have a significant effect 
on implicit attitude, rather than an explicit attitude under a high cognitive load.  
 
Figure 2.5 
PREDICTION FOR H5 & 6 
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Similar to the effect of a goal prime on preference, an individual should have an implicit 
attitude consistent with the goal prime. In other words, under a luxury goal, he or she should 
have a more favorable implicit attitude toward a luxury brand over a frugal brand than under a 
frugal goal. Since luxury (frugal) brands are a means to achieve a luxury (frugal) goal, an 
individual with a luxury (frugal) goal should implicitly have more (less) favorable attitudes 
toward a luxury brand over a frugal brand. However, under low cognitive load, where an 
individual assumes a more deliberate processing style in his or her behavior, the goal prime 
should not affect an implicit attitude (Please see Figure 2.5 for prediction). Thus,  
H5: Under a high cognitive load, an implicit attitude is consistent with the goal prime.  
H6: Under a low cognitive load, an implicit attitude is unaffected by the goal prime. 
2.3.2.2. Hypothesis 7 (The Effect of Mood on Implicit Attitude) 
Lacking self-control, an individual in a negative mood prioritizes immediate rewards (e.g., 
buying luxury brands to make himself/herself feel better) rather than long-term benefits (e.g., 
saving money by buying frugal brands), more so than an individual in a positive mood (Tice, 
Bratslavsky, and Baumeister, 2001). Thus, an individual in a negative mood may have more 
favorable implicit attitudes toward luxury brands over frugal brands than an individual in a 
positive mood.  
Once an individual in a negative mood lacks self-control, obtaining immediate rewards 
(e.g., feeling better by buying luxury brands) may become more important than other long-term 
goals (e.g., saving money by buying frugal brands). Thus, an individual’s implicit attitude toward 
luxury brands becomes a more efficient means to obtain immediate rewards than frugal brands, 
and therefore may become a more favorable goal than that toward a frugal brand.    
As the MODE model suggests, under a low opportunity condition (e.g., a high cognitive 
load), an individual’s cognition and behavior are guided more by automatic processing, 
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compared with a high opportunity condition (e.g., a low cognitive load). Compared with 
deliberative processing, an implicit attitude plays more of a role in guiding an individual’s 
cognition and behavior under automatic processing, than does an explicit attitude. Therefore, the 
effect of the  mood on implicit attitude should be more pronounced under a high cognitive load, 
than under a low cognitive load (Please see Figure 2.6 for prediction). Thus,   
H7: (a) As a mood decreases (becomes more negative), the implicit attitude for luxury 
brands increases; (b) This effect is less pronounced under a low cognitive load than under 
a high cognitive load.  
 
Figure 2.6 
PREDICTION FOR H7 
 
2.3.2.3. Hypothesis 8 (Order of the IAT Blocks) 
Messner and Vosgerau (2010) studied the effects of order of administrating the IAT 
blocks on the IAT overall results. In the IAT, two categories (e.g., luxury and frugal) are paired 
28 
 
with either positive or negative words. For instance, Blocks 3 & 4 have frugal and positive on the 
left, and luxury and negative are on the right. Then these pairs are switched in Blocks 6 & 7: 
luxury and positive are on the left, and frugal and negative are on the right. Messner and 
Vosgerau (2010) argued that the order of this combination affects the response time of this 
categorization task. In other words, one can combine luxury and positive (on the left) and frugal 
and negative (on the right) in Blocks 3 & 4, and then frugal and positive (on the left) and luxury 
and negative (on the right) in Blocks 6 & 7 (i.e., we call this combination 1).  
Another alternative is to combine frugal and positive (on the left) and luxury and negative 
(on the right) in Blocks 3 & 4, and then luxury and positive (on the left) and frugal and negative 
(on the right) in Blocks 6 & 7 (i.e., we call this combination 2). In Blocks 6 & 7, a participant 
learns a new category combination that is inconsistent with that in Blocks 3 & 4 which, Messner 
and Vosgerau (2010) argued, results in a slower response time in Blocks 6 & 7 than in Blocks 3 
& 4, due to cognitive inertia. The study found that due to cognitive inertia, whenever an 
individual learns a new rule completely different from an earlier learned rule, it takes more time 
to learn and follow the new rule. Therefore, regardless of the compatibility of word pairs (either 
of combination 1 or of combination 2), the categorization task in Blocks 6 and 7 will take more 
time.  
For combination 1, the tendency for a longer response time for Blocks 6 & 7 than for 
Blocks 3 & 4 results in stronger associations between luxury and positive, and between frugal 
and negative, resulting in an interpretation of a stronger preference for luxury brands over frugal 
brands than true preference.  For combination 2, a tendency for a longer response time for 
Blocks 6 & 7 than for Blocks 3 & 4 results in stronger associations between frugal and positive, 
and between luxury and negative, resulting in interpretation of a weaker preference for luxury 
brands than over frugal brands than true preference.  
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H8: Compared to IAT combination two, IAT combination one results in a more favorable 
implicit attitude toward luxury brands than toward frugal brands. 
2.3.3. Study 3: Effect of Goal on Explicit Attitude 
2.3.3.1. Hypothesis 9 (The Goal Prime on Explicit Attitude) 
The effect of goal activation on explicit attitude is limited (Ferguson and Bargh, 2004). 
This is because explicit attitude is not as functional as implicit attitude in judging quickly the 
desirability and undesirability of objects, preparing for goal-consistent behavior and achieving 
goals (Ferguson and Bargh, 2004). Also, under low cognitive load (i.e., high opportunity), where 
deliberate processing more likely takes place, we expect no effect of goal prime on either explicit 
or implicit attitudes. Thus, under low cognitive load, we expect no effect of goal prime on 
explicit attitudes. Please see Figure 2.7 for prediction. Thus,     
H9: Explicit attitude is unaffected by goal prime, regardless of cognitive load. 
 
Figure 2.7  
PREDICTION FOR H9 
 
2.3.3.2. Hypothesis 10 (Effect of Mood on Explicit Attitude) 
We have discussed that lacking self-control, an individual in a negative mood prioritizes 
immediate rewards (e.g., buying luxury brands) rather than long-term benefits (e.g., saving 
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money by buying frugal brands), more so than an individual in a positive mood (Tice, 
Bratslavsky, and Baumeister, 2001). Thus, an individual in a negative mood may have a more 
favorable attitude, not only in implicit attitudes, but also in explicit attitudes toward luxury 
brands over frugal brands, than an individual in a positive mood.  
Once an individual in a negative mood lacks self-control, obtaining immediate rewards 
(e.g., feeling better by buying luxury brands) may become more important than long-term goals 
(e.g., saving money by buying frugal brands). Thus, his or her attitude towards luxury brands, as 
a more efficient means to obtain immediate rewards, may show more favorable implicit attitudes 
and explicit attitudes, than toward frugal brands (Please see Figure 2.8 for prediction).    
 
Figure 2.8 
PREDICTION FOR H10 
 
 As the MODE model suggests, under a high opportunity condition (e.g., a low cognitive 
load), an individual’s cognition and behavior are guided more by deliberative processing, when 
compared with a low opportunity condition (e.g., high cognitive load). Compared with automatic 
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processing, an explicit attitude plays a larger role in guiding an individual’s cognition and 
behavior under deliberative processing, than does an implicit attitude. Therefore, the effect of 
mood on an explicit attitude should be more pronounced under a low cognitive load than under a 
high cognitive load. Thus,    
H10: (a) As mood decreases (more negative), explicit attitude for luxury brands 
increases; and (b) this effect is more pronounced under a low cognitive load. 
2.4. METHODS 
2.4.1. Design 
Subjects are engaged in multiple tasks on a computer to collect response latencies. A 2 
(mood: positive, negative) by 2 (cognitive load: high, low) by 2 (goal prime: frugal, luxury) 
between-subjects design was employed in all three studies.  The only difference between the 
studies was the dependent variable. In Study 1, the dependent variable was preference. In Study 




Subjects were asked to recall the happiest or unhappiest event in their lives, using an 
open-ended question. Subjects were also asked to describe the event as vividly as possible, 
including what exactly happened on that day, and how the event made them feel. This mood 
manipulation was successfully used in previous studies (Schwarz and Clore, 1983: Fishbach and 
Labroo, 2007; Labroo and Patrick, 2009). 
2.4.2.2. Goal 
A supraliminal priming method was employed (Chartrand and Bargh, 1996), where 
subjects were given work on a scrambled sentence completion task. In other words, subjects 
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constructed a grammatically correct four-word sentence from a five-word jumble. Among the 
twelve jumbles in total, ten jumbles contained a prime word associated with either a decadent 
goal or a wholesome goal. Prime words for the frugal goal include saving, bargain, and 
economical. Those for the luxury goal include rich, diamond, and lavish (Please see Table 2.1 for 
the full list of prime words and scrambled sentences).  
Table 2.1 
SCRAMBLED SENTENCES FOR GOAL MANIPULATION 















ball the throw toss silently 
be will swear rich they 
ate she it diamond all 
he lavish drops only seems 
somewhat yacht I am retired 
should now be wealthy they 
they obedient him often meet 
millionaire he hides there over 
is it upscale plant very 
send I mail it will 
high-class alone very are they 
sky the elegance blue is 
 
ball the throw toss silently 
be will swear saving they 
ate she it bargain all 
he frugal drops only seems 
somewhat coupon I am retired 
should now be economical they 
they obedient him often meet 
discount he hides there over 
is it cost-effective plant very 
send I mail it over 
cost-conscious alone very are they 















Note: Prime words are italicized only for illustration purposes in the table 
For instance, from the five-word jumble, “be will swear saving  they,” subjects are 
expected to construct the grammatically correct sentence “they will be saving” (the prime word, 
saving, is italicized for illustration purposes; this was not italicized in the actual experiment). In 
supraliminal priming, an individual is aware of the stimulus itself (scrambled sentences, or prime 
words), but they are not aware that the priming is affecting their cognitive processes or their 
behavior.          
2.4.2.3. Cognitive Load 
Subjects in the low load condition are asked to memorize a 2 digit number, while subjects 
in the high load condition are asked to memorize an 8 digit number. Subjects are asked to keep 
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the number in mind throughout the experiment. At the end of the study, they are asked to recall 
the number.    
2.4.3. Measures 
2.4.3.1. Implicit Attitude 
The implicit association test (IAT) is employed as an implicit attitude measure. In the 
IAT, subjects engage in two categorization tasks. We follow the same procedure employed in the 
research of Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz (1998). Subjects are shown frugal and luxury 
brand names, as well as positive and negative words. First, they are asked to categorize the word 
either as luxury or positive (located on left label) or as frugal or negative (located on right label), 
(i.e., Task 1).  When a brand name or a word is supposed to be categorized as labels on the left 
(i.e., luxury and positive), subjects are expected to push “E” on the key board. When a brand 
name or a word is supposed to be categorized as labels on the right (i.e., frugal and negative), 
subjects are expected to push “I” on the key board. Next, they are asked to categorize the word 
either as frugal or positive (located on left label) or as luxury or negative (located on right label) 
(i.e., task two). The response times for these categorization tasks are measured to compute the 
average response times for these two tasks.  
When an individual’s association between luxury (frugal) brands and positive (negative) 
words is stronger than that between luxury (frugal) brands and negative (positive) words, we 
assume that the average response time for Task 1 is shorter than that for Task 2. Thus, when the 
average response time for Task 2 minus the average response time for Task 1 is positive, we can 
assume that this individual has a preference for luxury brands over frugal brands.  
Implicit attitude will be computed following the algorithm developed by Greenwald, 
Nosek, and Banaji (2003).  Among the data from seven blocks (see Table 2.2 for the detail of 
each block), the analysis will utilize data only from Blocks 3, 4, 6, and 7. First, data considered 
34 
 
as outliers will be eliminated, including trials where the response latency is beyond 10,000 ms or 
trials where the responses are less than 300ms, accounting for more than 10% of the trials. The 
former will be eliminated because one single trial is unlikely to take more than 10,000 ms if a 
subject is paying full attention to the task. Thus, it is possible that a subject is engaged in other 
unrelated task (e.g., thinking about something else). The latter is eliminated because the trials 
with less than 300ms latencies are more likely to be considered as random responses (i.e., not 
following the instructions).   
After this treatment for outliers, the mean for correct response latencies for each block 
will be calculated. One standard deviation for all trials of Blocks 3 and 6, and another standard 
deviation for all trials of Blocks 4 and 7 will be computed. Response latencies for incorrect 
answers will be replaced with the block mean (previously computed), plus 600ms.  Then, for 
each block (i.e., Blocks 3, 4, 6, and 7), we average the response latencies that include the original 
latency for correct responses, as well as the replaced latency for incorrect responses, resulting in 
Mb3 Mb4 Mb6 and Mb7. Then we compute the differences between Mb6 and Mb3 (Mb6 - Mb3) and 
between Mb7 and Mb4 (Mb7 - Mb4).   Also, we divide each value by its associated standard 
deviation, resulting in (Mb6 - Mb3) /(SD b6&b3) and (Mb7 - Mb4) /(SD b7&b4).  Finally, we average 
the two values  (Please see Table 2.2.). 
2.4.3.2. Explicit Attitude 
For explicit attitude measures, 9-point scales (good vs. bad, like vs. dislike, and favorable 
vs. unfavorable) were used to measure explicit attitude for each brand (frugal or luxury). 
Subjects evaluated five frugal brands and five luxury brands, one at a time. Subjects chose 1 to 
indicate an unfavorable attitude (i.e., bad, dislike, unfavorable) and chose 9 to indicate a 
favorable attitude (i.e., good, like, and favorable). Summated scales for three items were 
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computed, both for frugal and luxury brands. Then, in the analysis, summated scales for frugal 
brands were subtracted from those for luxury brands. 
Table 2.2 
SEQUENCE OF TRIAL BLOCKS IN THE IAT 
Block Number    
of 
Trials 
Functions Items assigned to left-key 
response 























































Positive words +  
Luxury brand names 
 
Positive words +  
Luxury brand names 
 
Frugal brand names 
 
Positive words +  
Frugal brand names 
 
Positive words +  
Frugal brand names 




Negative words +  
Frugal brand names 
 
Negative words +  
Frugal brand names 
 
Luxury brand names 
 
Negative words + 
Luxury brand names 
 
Negative words + 
Luxury brand names 
 
2.4.3.3. Preference 
Subjects were asked to indicate preference between two brands (one frugal and another 
luxury) in several product categories for ten pairs of brands. For instance, subjects were asked, 
“If you were to purchase a hotel service, which brand do you prefer?” Then, they are given two 
choices:  Best Western as a frugal choice or Ritz-Carlton as a luxury choice. For five pairs of 
brands, subjects chose “1” when they preferred the frugal brand, “5” when preference for two 
brands was indifferent, or “9” when they preferred the luxury brand. For another five pairs of 
brands, subjects chose “1” when they preferred the luxury brand, “5” when preference for two 
brands was indifferent, or “9” when they preferred the frugal brand. In repeated measures 
ANOVA, preference scores for the latter five pairs of brands were reversed. That is, in the 
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analysis, “1” indicates a preference for frugal brands and “9” indicates a preference for luxury 
brands.      
2.4.3.4. Mood 
Four items with a 9-point scale (irritable vs. pleased, sad vs. happy, depressed vs. 
cheerful, and bad mood vs. good mood) are used to measure mood.   
2.4.3.5. Trait-Materialism 
We measured an individual’s materialism which is associated with consumer lifestyle, 
where owning material goods was considered to be a crucial life objective. The materialism scale 
was adopted from Richins and Dawson (1992). See Appendix III for the list of items.  
2.4.3.6. Cognitive Load 
At the end of each study, participants were asked to recall the number shown in the 
beginning of the study, i.e., subjects typed a two or an eight digit number.   
2.4.4. Material Pretests 
2.4.4.1. Pretest 1: Brand Selection 
 Pretest 1 was conducted to determine brands that are considered either luxury or frugal. 
Participants were asked to evaluate the strength of brand association with frugal or luxury. A 9-
point scale was used to denote “1” (luxury) and “9” (frugal). In Pretest 1, 62 undergraduate 
students evaluated 36 brands (18 potential luxury brands and 18 potential frugal brands).  Seven 
luxury brands had means below the mid-point (the means ranged from 1.27 to 3.69) and seven 
frugal brands had means above the mid-point (the means ranged from 6.39 to 8.52); these were 
selected. Please see Tables 2.3 and 2.4 for the detailed results. Repeated measures ANOVA 
revealed that the seven luxury brand names (M=2.205) were rated higher in luxury than the 
seven frugal brand names (M=7.528) (F 1, 61 = 1601.66, p <.001, η2 = .963).  
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At the end of the main study, 203 undergraduate students evaluated six additional brands 
(three potentially frugal and three potentially luxury brands) for the analysis. The means for three 
luxury brands were below mid-point (the means ranged from 2.16 to 3.13) and the means for 
three frugal brands were at least above the mid-point (the means ranged from 5.84 to 6.93.  
Please see Tables 2.3 and 2.4 for the detailed results. Further analysis revealed that these three 
luxury brand names (M=2.708) were rated higher in luxury than the other three frugal brand 
names (M=6.483) (F 1, 202 = 540.390, p <.001, η2 = .728). Thus, these additional three brands 
were included in the analysis. Thus, overall, ten luxury brands, including BMW, Ritz-Carlton, 
and Nordstrom, as well as ten frugal brands, inclusive of Kia, Best Western, and Dollar General, 
were selected for the analysis.   
Table 2.3 
BRAND IMAGE RATING (LUXURY BRANDS) 
Brand Luxury or Frugal 
Rating 
Category N 
BMW 1.55 Attitude and Preference 62 
Ritz-Carlton 1.27 Attitude and Preference 62 
Nordstrom 2.92 Attitude and Preference 62 
Four Seasons 2.89 Attitude and Preference 62 
Saks Fifth Avenue 1.61 Attitude and Preference 62 
Armani 1.50 Only Preference 62 
Hyatt 3.69 Only Preference 62 
Rolex 2.16 Only Preference 203 
Neiman Marcus 2.83 Only Preference 203 
Ralph Lauren 3.13 Only Preference 203 
*9-point scale (1:Associated with Luxury, 9: Associated with Frugal) 
Pretest 1( N=62),  Main Study (N=203) 
 
2.4.4.2. Pretest 2: Prime Words Generation  
 Two additional pretests were conducted to choose prime words for the goal manipulation 
(frugal vs. luxury). In Pretest 2, 16 undergraduate students completed a free recall task for two 
given words (i.e., frugal and luxury). They were asked to list a set of five words associated with 
frugal and another set of five words associated with luxury. We also selected a series of words 
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from the free association norms database, provided by Nelson, McEvoy, and Schreiber (1998). 
This database provides results from free words association tests for many words, including 
luxury, rich, elegant, and others. We also selected some synonyms of wholesome and decadent. 
Using these three sources, we constructed a list of 25 prime words to associate with luxury goal 
and 24 words to associate with frugal goal.    
Table 2.4 
BRAND IMAGE RATING (FRUGAL BRANDS) 
Brand Luxury or Frugal 
Rating 
Category N 
Kia 7.11 Attitude and Preference 62 
Best Western 6.98 Attitude and Preference 62 
Dollar General 8.52 Attitude and Preference 62 
Motel 6 8.50 Attitude and Preference 62 
Wal-Mart 7.68 Attitude and Preference 62 
Hanes 6.39 Only Preference 62 
Days Inn 7.52 Only Preference 62 
Timex 5.84 Only Preference 203 
Sam's Club 6.93 Only Preference 203 
Old Navy 6.68 Only Preference 203 
*9-point scale (1:Associated with Luxury, 9: Associated with Frugal) 
Pretest 1( N=62), Main Study (N=203) 
2.4.4.3. Pretest 3: Prime Words Validation 
 In Pretest 3, 24 undergraduate students evaluated the 49 (25 luxury and 24 frugal) prime 
words on both valence and strength of association with “frugal” or “luxury.” Ten primes words, 
relatively associated with “luxury,” where the means ranged from 2.625 to 1.833 on a 9-point 
scale (“1,” Strongly associated with "Luxury," to “9,” Not at all associated with "Luxury") were 
selected for further testing. All ten prime words were rated as positive rather than negative, with 
the means ranging from 6.04 to 7.75, also on a 9-point scale (“1,” negative to “9,” positive) 
(Please see Table 2.5). Then, another ten prime words, relatively associated with “frugal,” where 
the means ranged from 6.04 to 7.67 on a 9-point scale (“1,” Not at all associated with 
"FRUGAL,” to “9,” Strongly associated with "FRUGAL") were selected for further testing. All 
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of these ten prime words are rated as relatively positive, the means ranging from 6.08 to 7.29 in a 
9-point scale (1: negative, 9: positive) (Please see Table 2.6).  
Table 2.5 
PRIME WORDS RATING FOR LUXURY (N=24) 
Prime Words Luxury Valence 
Lavish 1.833 6.04 
Yacht 1.875 7.63 
Millionaire 2.250 7.63 
Upscale 2.292 7.25 
Diamond 2.292 7.75 
Wealthy 2.375 7.75 
Rich 2.417 6.92 
High-Class 2.417 7.54 
Elegance 2.625 7.83 
 
Table 2.6 
PRIME WORDS RATING FOR FRUGAL (N=24) 
Prime Words Frugal Valence 
Thrifty 7.67 6.08 
Cost-Conscious 7.67 6.25 
Economical 7.17 7.08 
Saving 6.88 7.29 
Cost-Effective 6.58 7.29 
Discount 6.54 6.88 
Coupon 6.38 5.96 
Sale 6.21 7.13 
Bargain 6.04 7.00 
 
Repeated measures ANOVA revealed that the ten prime words for luxury were rated 
higher in luxury (M=2.264) than those for frugal (M=6.685) (F 1, 23 = 171.78, p <.001, η2 = .882). 
The ten prime words for a luxury goal include rich, diamond, lavish, yacht, wealthy, millionaire, 
upscale, high-class, elegance, and luxury. Then, the prime words for frugal include saving, 
bargain, frugal, coupon, economical, discount, cost-effective, cost-conscious, sale, and thrifty. 
2.4.5. Procedures 
2.4.5.1. Study 1 
Several days before the experiment, 96 student subjects completed an online study that 
was intended to measure the traits of frugality and materialism. The subjects then participated in 
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a study that was administered in a computer lab. The study was administered with E-prime 
software to measure response latencies. First, subjects completed a mood manipulation task, 
describing either a happy or unhappy event. After completing the task, as a manipulation check, 
subjects are asked to indicate how this task made them feel, using a four-item mood scale 
(irritable vs. pleased, sad vs. happy, depressed vs. cheerful, and bad mood vs. good mood).  
Then, cognitive load was manipulated, followed by goal manipulation (i.e., sentence 
completion task).  Next, subjects reported their preferences toward ten brand pairs. Then, 
subjects were asked to recall the number that they were asked to remember in the beginning of 
the study. At the end of the study, subjects were asked to guess what had been tested in the study. 
In this question, subjects were presented with a list of tasks they completed in the study and were 
asked to guess how each task was related. This task was intended to identify those subjects who 
successfully guessed the purpose of the priming task (i.e., sentence completion task).    
2.4.5.2. Study 2 
Forty-eight subjects completed Study 2. The procedure for Study 2 was identical to that 
for Study 1, except that the subjects completed the IAT, instead of a preference task.  
2.4.5.3. Study 3 
Fifty subjects completed Study 3. The procedure for Study 3 was identical to that for 
Study 1, except that the subjects completed explicit attitude measures, rather than a preference 
task.  
2.5 ANALYSIS 
2.5.1. Preliminary Checks 
2.5.1.1. Reliability 
In all three studies, the four-item 9-point scales were used to measure how the description 
of happy events made respondents feel. Cronbach's Alphas were .958 in Study 1, .950 in Study 2, 
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and .955 in Study 3. Similarly, a five-item 9-point scale was used to measure materialism. 
Cronbach's Alphas were .849 in Study 1, .804 in Study 2, and .811 in Study 3. Although the 
scale originally had six items, one item was deleted to improve the reliability. After the deletion, 
Cronbach's Alpha improved from .753 to .849 in Study 1, from .735 to .804 in Study 2, and .781 
to .811 in Study 3.   
2.5.1.2. Manipulation and Confound Check (Study 1) 
In Study 1, participants who described a happy event reported that this task made them 
feel significantly more positive (M = 6.778) than those who described an unhappy event (M = 
3.376) (F 1, 91 = 129.986, p < .001, η
2 
= .588). Also, the manipulations did not affect the mood 
measures. The effect of goal prime on the mood measure was not significant (F 1, 91 = .943, p 
= .334, η
2 
= .010). Similarly, the effect of cognitive load on the mood measure was not 
significant (F 1, 91 = .089, p = .766, η
2 
= .001).   
 The trait (i.e., materialism) was measured separately a few days before the main study. 
Therefore, we did not expect the manipulations to affect the trait measures. The analysis revealed 
that none of the following manipulations had any effect on trait (i.e., materialism): mood (F 1, 89 
= .099, p = .754, η
2 
= .001), cognitive load (F 1, 89 = .025, p = .874, η
2 
= .000), and goal prime (F 1, 
89 = .182, p = .671, η
2 
= .002).    
 As expected, participants under low cognitive load recalled the two-digit number (i.e., 
78) more accurately than those under high cognitive load recalled the eight-digit number (i.e., 
75893167) (chi-square test = 35.536, p<.001).  Under low-cognitive load, all 51 participants 
recalled the number correctly, whereas under high-cognitive load, only 23 participants among 48 
participants recalled the number correctly. However, as expected, neither the mood manipulation 
(chi-square test = .975, p=.323) nor the goal prime (chi-square = .030, p=.863) affected the 
accuracy of the number recall.    
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2.5.1.3. Manipulation and Confound Check (Study 2) 
In Study 2, participants who described a happy event reported that this task made them 
feel significantly more positive (M = 6.809) than those who described an unhappy event (M = 
3.828) (F 1, 40 = 54.356, p < .001, η
2 
= .576). The manipulations did not affect the mood measures. 
The effect of goal prime on the mood measure was not significant (F 1, 40 = .158, p = .693, η
2 
= .004). Similarly, the effect of cognitive load on the mood measure was not significant (F 1, 40 
= .580, p = .451, η
2 
= .014).  The analysis revealed that none of the following manipulations 
affected materialism: mood (F 1, 39 = .895, p = .350, η
2 
= .022), cognitive load (F 1, 39 = .030, p 
= .863, η
2 
= .001), and goal prime (F 1, 39 = .009, p = .924, η
2 
= .000). 
As expected, participants under low cognitive load recalled the two-digit number (i.e., 
78) more accurately than those under high cognitive load, who recalled the eight-digit number 
(i.e., 75893167) (chi-square = 12.735, p<.001). All 20 participants in the low-cognitive load 
recalled the number correctly, while only 15 among the 28 participants under the high-cognitive 
load recalled the number accurately. However, as expected, neither the mood (chi-square = .105, 
p=.745) nor the goal prime (chi-square = .639, p=.424) affected the accuracy of the number 
recall.    
2.5.1.4. Manipulation and Confound Check (Study 3) 
 In Study 3, participants who described a happy event reported that this task made them 
feel a significantly more positive mood (M = 6.956) than those who described an unhappy event 
(M = 3.309) (F 1, 42 = 82.771, p < .001, η
2 
= .663). However, the manipulations did not affect the 
mood measures. The effect of goal prime on the mood measure was not significant (F 1, 42 = .913, 
p = .345, η
2 
= .021). Similarly, the effect of cognitive load on mood was not significant (F 1, 42 = 
1.420, p = .240, η
2 
= .033).  The analysis revealed that none of the following manipulations 
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affected materialism: mood (F 1, 42 = 1.080, p = .305, η
2 
= .025), cognitive load (F 1, 42 = .000, p 
= .994, η
2 
= .000), and goal prime (F 1, 42 = .035, p = .852, η
2 
= .001). 
As expected, participants under low cognitive load recalled the two-digit number (i.e., 
78) more accurately than those under high cognitive load recalled the eight-digit number (i.e., 
75893167) (chi-square test = 21.805, p<.001).  All 29 participants in the low-cognitive load 
recalled the number accurately, yet only 9 participants among 21 participants in the high-
cognitive load recalled the number accurately. However, as expected, neither the mood (chi-
square test = .025, p=.874) nor the goal prime (chi-square test = .102, p=.750) affected the 
accuracy of the number recall.    
2.5.1.5. Outlier Analysis 
In Study 1, three subjects reported that they thought there was a connection between the 
goal manipulation and preference. Although all of these subjects may not have identified the role 
of the prime words in the goal manipulation task, these three subjects were removed from the 
analysis to avoid any possibility that the goal was consciously activated.  In Study 2, none of the 
subjects reported a connection between the goal manipulation and the IAT. In Study 3, three 
subjects reported that they thought there was a connection between the goal manipulation and the 
explicit attitude task. Finally, to avoid any possibility that the goal was consciously activated, 
these three subjects were removed from the analysis.   
 2.5.2. Study 1 
2.5.2.1. Hypothesis 1 
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to assess the effect of mood, cognitive load, 
goal, and materialism on preference. The dependent variable was brand preference toward luxury 
brand vs. frugal brand. The within-subject factor consisted of ten different pairs of brands in 
different product categories. The between-subject factors were mood (positive vs. negative), 
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cognitive load (high vs. low load), goal prime (luxury vs. frugal), and trait (median split of 
materialism). Please see Table 2.7 for the results. 
Table 2.7 
REPEATED MEASURES OF ANOVA RESULTS FOR PREFERENCE 
Sources df F p-value η2 
Brand 1 24.529 .000 .232 
Brand x Mood 1 2.485 .119 .030 
Brand x Goal Prime 1 .893 .347 .011 
Brand x Cognitive Load 1 1.377 .244 .017 
Brand x Materialism  1 .974 .327 .012 
Brand x Mood  x Goal Prime 1 1.177 .281 .014 
Brand x Mood  x Cognitive Load  1 .816 .369 .010 
Brand x Mood  x Materialism 1 1.380 .244 .017 
Brand x Goal Prime x Cognitive Load 1 .460 .500 .006 
Brand x Goal Prime x Materialism 1 .589 .445 .007 
Brand x Cognitive Load x Materialism 1 1.029 .313 .013 
Brand x Mood  x Goal Prime x Cognitive Load 1 .978 .326 .012 
Brand x Mood x Goal Prime x Materialism 1 1.038 .311 .013 
Brand x Mood x Cognitive Load x Materialism 1 .566 .454 .007 
Brand x Goal Prime x Cognitive Load x 
Materialism 
1 .939 .335 .011 
Brand x Mood  x Goal Prime x Cognitive Load 
x Materialism 
1 1.797 .184 .022 
Mood 1 3.700 .058 .044 
Goal 1 3.008 .087 .036 
Cognitive Load 1 5.810 .018 .067 
Materialism 1 3.906 .052 .046 
Mood x Goal 1 1.313 .255 .016 
Mood x Cognitive Load 1 .954 .332 .012 
Mood x Materialism 1 6.658 .012 .076 
Goal x Cognitive Load 
Goal x Materialism 
Cognitive Load x Materialism 
Mood x Goal x Cognitive Load 
Mood x Goal x Materialism 
Mood x Cognitive Load x Materialism 
Goal x Cognitive Load x Materialism 

































Note: All tests reported are two-tailed.  
 
    
The three-way interaction among goal prime, cognitive load, and materialism on 
preference was not significant (F 1, 84 = .200, p = .656, η
2
 = .002). Although we predicted that 
under a high cognitive load, consumers prefer brands consistent with the goal prime, the main 
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effect of goal prime on preference was not significant (F 1, 39 = 1.088, p = .303, η
2
 = .027).  
Please see Figure 2.9 for the result. 
 
Figure 2.9  




GOAL AND MOOD ON PREFERENCE 
 
However, the three-way interaction among cognitive load, mood, and goal prime on 
preference was significant (F 1, 84 = 4.512, p = .037, η
2
 = .051). Under a high cognitive load, the 
two-way interaction between mood and goal prime on preference was significant (F 1, 39 = 6.345, 
p = .016, η
2
 = .140). Under a high cognitive load and in the positive mood condition, individuals 
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with the luxury goal prime had a higher preference for the luxury brands than did those with the 
frugal goal prime (MLUX=8.009, MFRUGAL=6.476) (F 1, 20 = 6.804, p = .017, η
2
 = .254). Under a 
high cognitive load and in the negative mood condition, brand preferences were not affected by 
the goal prime (F 1, 19 = 1.016, p = .326, η
2
 = .051). Thus, H1 was supported in a positive mood, 
but not in a negative mood condition.  Please see Figure 2.10 for the two-way interaction of 
mood and goal prime on preference under high cognitive load.   
 
Figure 2.11 
ACTUAL FOR H2 
 
2.5.2.2. Hypothesis 2 
Under a low cognitive load, the interaction between materialism and goal prime on 
preference was not significant (F 1, 42 = .590, p = .447, η
2
 = .014). Under a low cognitive load, 
only the main effect of materialism was significant (F 1, 42 = 8.563, p = .006, η
2
 = .169), where 
preference was higher for luxury brands for consumers with high materialism (M=6.699) than for 
consumers with low materialism (M=5.319). The goal prime did not affect preference for 
individuals with either high materialism (F 1, 25 = .307, p = .584, η
2
 = .012), supporting H2b, or 
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low materialism (F 1, 17 = 1.550, p = .230, η
2
 = .084), rejecting H2a. Please see Figure 2.11 for 
the result. 
2.5.2.3. Hypothesis 3  
H3 was meant to test whether the effect of goal prime on preference is maintained over 
time. As was tested for H1, consumers under a high cognitive load preferred brands consistent 
with the goal prime in a positive mood, but not in a negative mood. As it was meaningless to test 
this prediction in a condition where no main effect of goal prime on preference existed, H3 was 
tested under a high cognitive load and in a positive mood. 
 
Figure 2.12 
ACTUAL FOR H3 
 
Under a high cognitive load and a positive mood, the effect of goal prime on preference 
was significant (F 1, 19 = 5.92, p = .025, η2 = .238). Yet the two-way interaction between 
preference order and goal prime was not significant (F 1, 19 = 1.396, p = .252, η2 = .068), 
supporting H3a and rejecting H3b. This is an indication that the prime words are activating a 




2.5.2.4. Hypothesis 4 
Both the main effect of mood on preference (F 1, 81 = 3.7, p = .058, η2 = .044) and the 
two-way interaction between mood and cognitive load on preference (F 1, 81 = .954, p = .332, η2 
= .012) were not significant, rejecting both H4a and H4b. Please see figure 2.13 for the result. 
Further analysis revealed that under a positive mood, individuals under a high cognitive load 
preferred luxury brands to frugal brands, more than those under a low cognitive load (F 1, 81 = 
6.21, p = .015, η2 = .071). 
 
Figure 2.13 
ACTUAL FOR H4 
 
Also, under a high cognitive load, individuals in a positive mood preferred luxury brands 
to frugal brands, more than those in a negative mood (F 1, 81 = 4.244, p = .043, η2 = .050). 
However, since the three-way interaction of mood, cognitive load, and goal prime was 
significant (F 1, 81 = 5.046, p = .027, η2 = .059), the two-way interaction of mood and cognitive 
load on preference should be analyzed in relation with the goal prime. Please see 2.6.10 for 
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further discussion on the three way interaction of mood, cognitive load, and goal prime on 
preference.     
2.5.3. Study 2 
2.5.3.1. Hypotheses 5 & 6  
An analysis of variance was conducted to assess the effect of mood, cognitive load, goal, 
materialism, and category combination on implicit attitude. The dependent variable was implicit 
attitude toward luxury brands over frugal brands. The between-subject factors were mood 
(positive vs. negative), cognitive load (high vs. low load), goal prime (luxury vs. frugal), and 
trait (median split of materialism). Materialism had no meaningful effect on implicit attitude. 
Thus, we dropped this variable from the analysis. Please see Table 2.8 for the ANOVA results. 
Table 2.8 
ANOVA RESULTS FOR IMPLICIT ATTITUDE 
Sources df F p-value η2 
Mood 1 .186 .669 .006 
Goal 1 .546 .465 .017 
Cognitive Load 1 .874 .357 .027 
Category Combination 1 17.107 .000 .348 
Mood x Goal 1 .119 .732 .004 
Mood x Cognitive Load 1 1.830 .186 .054 
Mood x Category Combination 1 .471 .498 .014 
Goal x Cognitive Load 1 .816 .373 .025 
Goal x Category Combination 1 .107 .746 .003 
Cognitive Load x Category Combination 1 .048 .828 .001 
Mood x Goal x Cognitive Load 1 4.223 .048 .117 
Mood x Goal x Category Combination 1 .002 .963 .000 
Mood x Cognitive Load x Category 
Combination 
1 1.423 .242 .043 
Goal x Cognitive Load x Category 
Combination 
1 .167 .685 .005 
Mood x Goal x Cognitive Load x 
Category Combination 
1 .112 .740 .003 
Note: All tests reported are two-tailed.     
 
The main effect of goal prime on implicit attitude was not significant (F 1, 32 = .546, p 
= .465, η2 = .017). Similarly, the two-way interaction between goal prime and cognitive load on 
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implicit attitude was not significant (F 1, 32 = .546, p = .465, η2 = .017). Thus, the main effect of 
goal prime on implicit attitude was not significant regardless of cognitive load, rejecting H5, and 
supporting H6. However, the three-way interaction among mood, goal prime, and cognitive load 
on implicit attitude was significant (F 1, 32 = 4.223, p = .048, η2 = .117). Please see the next 




ACTUAL FOR H5 & H6 
 
2.5.3.2. Hypothesis 7 
 The main effect of mood on implicit attitude was not significant (F 1, 32 = .186, p = .669, 
η2 = .006). The interaction between mood and cognitive load on implicit attitude was not 
significant as well (F 1, 32 = 1.830, p = .186, η2 = .054). Thus, both H7a and H7b were rejected. 
Please see Figure 2.15 for the result. Pairwise comparisons also revealed that none of the 
conditions were significantly different (p-values>.05). For instance, in the negative mood 
condition, implicit attitudes for individuals under high cognitive load and low cognitive load 
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were not significantly different (F 1, 32 = 2.650, p = .113, η2 = .076). Also, under a high cognitive 
load, implicit attitudes for individuals in positive mood and those in negative mood were not 
significantly different (F 1, 32 = 1.825, p = .186, η2 = .054).  
 
Figure 2.15 
ACTUAL FOR H7 
 
However, the three-way interaction of mood, goal prime, and cognitive load on implicit 
attitude was significant (F 1, 32 = 4.223, p = .048, η2 = .117). Further analysis revealed that the 
two way-interaction of mood and goal on implicit attitude under a high cognitive load was not 
significant (F 1, 20 = 3.042, p = .097, η2 = .132). Under a low cognitive load, the main effect of 
goal prime (F 1, 12 = 1.395, p = .260, η2 = .104) on the implicit attitude was not significant. Under 
low cognitive load, the main effect of mood (F 1, 12 = .440, p = .520, η2 = .035) on implicit 
attitude was not significant. Similarly, under low cognitive load, the interaction of mood, and 
goal prime on implicit attitude was not significant (F 1, 12 = 1.513, p = .242, η2 = .112).  
Further analysis revealed that under a high cognitive load and the luxury goal prime, 
individuals in a negative mood had a more favorable implicit attitude toward the luxury brand 
than those in a positive mood (F 1, 32 = 4.199, p = .049, η2 = .116).  Another analysis revealed 
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that under a negative mood and the luxury goal prime, individuals under a high cognitive load 
had a more favorable implicit attitude toward the luxury brand than those under the low 
cognitive load (F 1, 32 = 5.626, p = .024, η2 = .150).    
2.5.3.3. Hypothesis 8 
The main effect of category combination on implicit attitude was significant (F 1, 91 = 
17.107, p < .001, η
2
 = .348) such that the implicit attitude for the luxury brand was higher in 
combination one (M= .959) than in combination two (M=.373), supporting H8. However, the 
two-way interactions between category combination and goal (F 1, 91 = .107, p = .746, η
2
 = .003), 
category combination and mood (F 1, 91 = .471, p = .498, η
2
 = .014), and category combination 
and cognitive load (F 1, 91 = .048, p = .828, η
2
 = .001) were not significant. Thus, H8 holds, 
regardless of goal prime, mood, or cognitive load.        
2.5.4. Study 3  
2.5.4.1. Hypothesis 9 
An ANOVA was conducted to assess the effect of mood, cognitive load, goal, and 
materialism on explicit attitude. The dependent variable was explicit attitude toward luxury 
brands over frugal brands. The between-subject factors were mood (positive vs. negative), 
cognitive load (high vs. low load), goal prime (luxury vs. frugal), and trait (median split of 
materialism). Please see Table 2.9 for the ANOVA results.  
As expected, the main effect of goal on explicit attitude was not significant (F 1, 34 = 
1.047, p = .313, η
2
 = .030), supporting H9. Also, there were no significant interactions on 
explicit attitude between goal prime and mood (F 1, 34 = .278, p = .602, η
2
 = .008) and between 
goal prime and cognitive load (F 1, 34 = .957, p = .335, η
2
 = .027). Thus, the main effect of goal 
prime on explicit attitude was not significant regardless of mood or cognitive load. For instance, 
under a low cognitive load, the main effect of goal prime on explicit attitude was not significant 
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(M = 3.108 for luxury goal and M = 2.238 for frugal goal) (F 1, 21 = 1.927, p = .180, η
2
 = .084). 
Please see Figure 2.16 for the result. 
Table 2.9 
REPEATED MEASURES OF ANOVA RESULTS FOR EXPLICIT ATTITUDE 
Sources df F p-value η2 
Mood 1 2.771 .105 .075 
Goal 1 1.047 .313 .030 
Cognitive Load 1 .107 .746 .003 
Materialism 1 1.758 .194 .049 
Mood x Goal 1 .278 .602 .008 
Mood x Cognitive Load 1 .170 .683 .005 
Mood x Materialism 1 3.801 .059 .101 
Goal x Cognitive Load 1 .957 .335 .027 
Goal x Materialism 1 .117 .735 .003 
Cognitive Load x Materialism 1 .088 .768 .003 
Mood x Goal x Cognitive Load 1 .265 .610 .008 
Mood x Goal x Materialism 1 .002 .965 .000 
Mood x Cognitive Load x Materialism 1 .289 .595 .008 
Goal x Cognitive Load x Materialism 1 1.420 .242 .040 
Mood x Goal x Cognitive Load x 
Materialism 
1 .037 .849 .001 




ACTUAL FOR H9 
 
2.5.4.2. Hypothesis 10 
      Although as expected, an individual in a negative mood (M = 3.106) had a more 
favorable explicit attitude for luxury brands than an individual in a positive mood (M = 2.383), 
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this main effect of mood on explicit attitude was not statistically significant (F 1, 34 = 2.771, p 
= .105, η2 = .075). Pairwise comparisons also revealed that none of the conditions were 
significantly different (p-values>.05). For instance, under a high cognitive load, explicit attitudes 
for individuals in a positive mood and those in a negative mood were not significantly different 
(F 1, 34 = 2.132, p = .153, η2 = .059). Please see Figure 2.17. 
 
Figure 2.17 
ACTUAL FOR H10 
 
The interaction of mood and materialism was marginally significant (F 1, 34 = 3.801, p 
= .059, η2 = .101). However, further analysis revealed that individuals with low consumer 
materialism had more favorable explicit attitudes for luxury brands in a negative mood 
(M=3.242) than in a positive mood (M=1.671) (F 1, 14 = 7.388, p = .017, η2 = .345). Among 
individuals with high consumer materialism, explicit attitudes were not affected by mood (F 1, 20 
= .042, p = .839, η2 = .002). Please see Figure 2.18 for the result. Thus, H10a was supported 
only for individuals with low materialism, but not for individuals with high materialism. The 
interaction of mood and cognitive load on explicit attitude was not significant (F 1, 34 = .170, p 
= .683, η2 = .005). Similarly, the three-way interaction of mood, materialism, and cognitive load 
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MOOD X TRAIT ON EXPLICIT ATTITUDE 
 
2.6 Discussion 
2.6.1. Hypothesis 1  
Although we have predicted that an individual prefers brands consistent with the goal 
prime regardless of consumer materialism, this prediction was supported only in a positive mood, 
but not in a negative mood. Whereas an individual in a positive mood preferred brands consistent 
with the goal prime, the study found that in a negative mood, brand preference was not affected 
by the goal prime.  Thus, the effect of the goal prime on preference was moderated by mood.  
Consistent with the mood-as-information approach, Fishbach and Labroo (2007) 
suggested an individual in a positive mood tends to approach the goal while an individual in a 
negative mood tends to avoid the goal. Thus, under a high cognitive load, where opportunity is 
low, an individual in a positive mood may approach the goal, with a result of goal-consistent 
56 
 
behavior. Under a high cognitive load, an individual in a negative mood may avoid the goal 
prime, with a result of goal-inconsistent behavior.  
2.6.2. Hypothesis 2 
We have predicted that under a low cognitive load (i.e., high opportunity) and high 
motivation (i.e., high materialism), preference would not be guided by automatic processes, and 
be less affected by a non-conscious goal prime. However, under a low cognitive load and low 
motivation (i.e., low materialism), preference would be guided by relatively automatic processes 
and be more affected by a non-conscious goal prime. The results show that under low-cognitive 
load, the two-way interaction between materialism and goal on preference was not significant. 
The goal prime did not affect preference, regardless of the degree of materialism. However, the 
main effect of materialism on preference was significant under low cognitive load. Thus, the 
results seem to indicate that under a low cognitive load (i.e., high opportunity), an individual’s 
preference is guided mainly by his or her trait (e.g., materialism) rather than by a non-conscious 
goal prime.    
2.6.3. Hypothesis 3 
Under a high cognitive load and a positive mood, subjects preferred brands consistent 
with the goal prime. If the goal prime is activating only semantic cues, the effect of goal prime 
on preference should diminish over time. Alternatively, if the goal prime is activating a goal, the 
effect of goal prime on preference should not diminish over time.     
In the study, subjects completed ten preference tasks that included one luxury brand and 
one frugal brand. If the goal prime merely activated semantic cues, its effect would diminish, due 
to decay in memory. In contrast, the goal prime might activate a goal. In such cases, its effect 
would not diminish, unless an individual achieved the goal. This is because the preference task is 
hypothetical and therefore not a real choice task, the individual should not have a satiation effect. 
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Since the two-way interaction between brand order and goal prime was not significant, the effect 
of the goal prime on preference was consistent over time. This indicates that the goal prime 
activates a goal rather than a semantic cue, thereby supporting H3a and rejecting H3b.  
2.6.4. Hypothesis 4 
Although the study predicted that compared to those in a positive mood, individuals in a 
negative mood tend to lack self-control favoring immediate rewards over long-term rewards, 
thus preferring luxury brands to frugal brands. Also, since a cognitive load may impair self-
control, we predicted that the effect of mood on preference should be more pronounced under 
high cognitive load than under low cognitive load. Despite our prediction, mood had no 
significant main effect on preference. This was true, regardless of cognitive load.  
However, it should be noted that a three-way interaction of mood, cognitive load, and 
goal prime was significant. This suggests that the effect of mood on preference should be 
discussed in relation to not only the cognitive load, but also the goal prime. Please refer to the 
discussion for H1 about this three-way interaction.       
2.6.5. Hypotheses 5 and 6 
The main effect of goal prime on implicit attitude was not significant, regardless of 
cognitive load, rejecting H5 and supporting H6. However, as the three-way interaction of mood, 
goal prime, and cognitive load on implicit attitude was significant, the effect of goal prime on 
implicit attitude should be addressed, not only in relation with cognitive load, but also with mood. 
Please see the next section for the discussion of this three-way interaction (Hypothesis 7).  
2.6.6. Hypothesis 7 
We predicted that as mood decreases (more negative), the implicit attitude for decadent 
brands increases (H7a). In addition, this effect should be less pronounced under low cognitive 
load than under high cognitive load (H7b). As the main effect of mood and the interaction effect 
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of mood and cognitive load on implicit attitude were not significant, H7a and H7b were rejected 
overall.     
However, the three-way interaction among mood, goal prime and cognitive load on 
implicit attitude was significant. Thus, the effect of mood on implicit attitude should be 
discussed in relation to not only cognitive load, but also to goal prime. Under a high cognitive 
load, the interaction between mood and goal prime on implicit attitude was not significant. 
Paired comparisons revealed that under a high cognitive load and the luxury goal prime, mood 
had a significant effect on implicit attitude (F 1, 32 = 4.199, p = .049, η2 = .116), and individuals 
in a negative mood had a more favorable implicit attitude toward luxury brand than did those in a 
positive mood (F 1, 32 = 4.199, p = .049, η2 = .116). Thus, H7a was supported under a high 
cognitive load and a luxury goal prime.  
This effect of mood on implicit attitude is not explained by a goal-approach tendency in a 
positive mood and a goal-avoidance tendency in a negative mood. Instead, it may be explained 
by the failure to self-control in a negative mood. An individual in a negative mood may be less 
motivated to self-control, favoring immediate rewards (e.g., feeling better by purchasing luxury 
brands) to long-term benefits (e.g., saving money by purchasing frugal brands).   
Under low cognitive load, the effects of mood, goal, nor the interaction between mood 
and goal on implicit attitude were significant. We did not expect the goal prime to affect implicit 
attitude under low cognitive load; therefore, this result is not surprising. Further analysis 
revealed that under a negative mood and a luxury goal prime, individuals under a high cognitive 
load had a more favorable implicit attitude toward the luxury brand than did those under low 
cognitive load (F 1, 32 = 5.626, p = .024, η
2
 = .150); again, this effect may be explained by the 
lack of self-control in a negative mood. Lack of self-control should be more pronounced under 
high cognitive load, where an individual’s conscious control becomes more impaired due to a 
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limited cognitive capacity. In sum, it seems that the three-way interaction of mood, cognitive 
load, and goal prime on implicit attitude was driven by a significant, main effect of mood under 
high cognitive load and luxury goal prime and the significant, main effect of cognitive load 
under luxury goal prime and negative mood.   
2.6.7. Hypothesis 8 
As discussed earlier, the means for implicit attitude were higher toward luxury brands in 
combination 1 than in combination 2 (.959 and .373, respectively). For combination 1, luxury 
and positive (categories on the left), as well as frugal and negative (categories on the right) were 
administered first in Steps 3 & 4 and switched later in Steps 6 & 7. In combination 2, frugal and 
positive (categories on the left), luxury and negative (categories on the right) were administered 
first in Steps 3 & 4 and switched later in Steps 6 & 7. Thus, support of H7 is an indication that 
administering combination 1 resulted in an improved implicit attitude toward a luxury brand over 
frugal brand than by administering combination 2.   
This finding is consistent with the argument of Messner and Vosgerau (2010) that it takes 
effort for an individual to learn a new category combination in Steps 6 & 7 that differs from a 
previously learned category combination in Steps 3 & 4. Thus, in the IAT, the response times for 
Steps 6 & 7 should be consistently longer than for Steps 3 & 4. This results in a higher 
preference for luxury brands in combination 1 and a higher preference for frugal brands in 
combination 2. Thus, from a method point of view, it is important to counterbalance the 
combination of categories in the IAT.  
2.6.8. Hypothesis 9 
The goal prime did not have a significant effect on explicit attitude, supporting H9. Also, 
the goal prime did not have a significant interaction with either mood or cognitive load. These 
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results, in conjunction with that those for Study 2, is consistent with the notion that goal 
activation affects explicit attitude less than it affects implicit attitude.      
2.6.9. Hypothesis 10 
We have predicted that as mood decreases (more negative), explicit attitude for decadent 
brands increases (H10a); this effect is more pronounced under low cognitive load (H10b). H10a 
was supported for individuals with low materialism, but not for individuals with high 
materialism, regardless of cognitive load. Interestingly, a negative mood tends to impair self-
control in individuals with low motivation (e.g., low materialism), but not in individuals with 
high motivation. This finding was true, regardless of goal prime.  
2.6.10. Post-hoc Analysis 1 (Studies 1 & 2)  
The three-way interactions among mood, goal, and cognitive load on preference (F 1, 81 = 
5.046, p = .027, η2 = .059) and on implicit attitude (F 1, 32 = 4.223, p = .048, η2 = .117) were 
significant. The MODE model suggests that an individual’s behavior is relatively automatic 
under low opportunity (e.g., high cognitive load), whereas an individual’s behavior is relatively 
deliberate under high opportunity (e.g., low cognitive load). Thus, under a high cognitive load, 
the pattern of a two-way interaction of mood and goal prime on implicit attitude should be 
similar to that on preference. Please see Figures 2.19 & 2.20.  
Under high cognitive load and a frugal goal prime, preference (F 1, 81 = .068, p = .795, η
2
 
= .001) or implicit attitude (F 1, 32 = .135, p = .715, η
2
 = .004) were unaffected by mood (positive 
vs. negative). Both preference and implicit attitude plots, under a high cognitive load and frugal 
goal prime, show a similar, flat line across positive and negative mood, as expected. However, 
under a high cognitive load and a luxury goal prime, with both preference and implicit attitude 
significantly different across positive mood and negative mood, the direction of the plots lay in 









MOOD X COGNITIVE LOAD X GOAL PRIME ON IMPLICIT ATTITUDE 
 
2.6.11. Post-hoc Analysis 2 (Studies 1 & 3) 
Whereas a three-way interaction of mood, goal, and cognitive load on preference was 
significant (F 1, 81 = 5.046, p = .027, η2 = .059), the same three-way interaction of mood, 
cognitive load, and goal prime on explicit attitude was not significant (F 1, 34 = .265, p = .610, η2 
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= .008). A paired comparison on explicit attitude revealed that no two means in the three-way 
interaction plots were significantly different from one another (See Figure 2.21).   
 
Figure 2.21 
MOOD X COGNITIVE LOAD X GOAL PRIME ON EXPLICIT ATTITUDE 
 
As discussed earlier, according to the MODE model, an individual’s behavior is 
relatively deliberate under high opportunity (e.g., low cognitive load). Thus, under a low 
cognitive load, the pattern of the two-way interaction of mood and goal prime on explicit attitude 
should be similar to that on preference.  Under a low cognitive load, preference was indifferent 
to mood, either in a luxury goal prime (F 1, 81 = .007, p = .934, η
2
 = .000) or in a frugal goal 
prime (F 1, 81 = .906, p = .344, η
2
 = .011). Similarly, under low cognitive load, explicit attitude 
was indifferent of mood under either the luxury goal prime (F 1, 34 = .309, p = .582, η
2
 = .009) or 
the frugal goal prime (F 1, 34 = .546, p = .465, η
2
 = .016). This is illustrated as relatively flat lines 
(both low load x Frugal, low load x Luxury) across positive and negative mood conditions in 
preference and explicit attitude interactions. Please see Figures 2.19 and 2.21. Although under a 
low cognitive load, the main effect of goal was not significant, either on preference (F 1, 42 = 
1.958, p = .169, η
2
 = .045) or on explicit attitude (F 1, 21 = 1.927, p = .180, η
2
 = .084), the low-
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load and luxury plots were constantly above the low-load and frugal plots for both preference 
and explicit attitude plots.  
2.6.12. Post-hoc Analysis 3 (Cognitive Load and Trait on Preference) 
A two way interaction between cognitive load and materialism on preference was 
significant (F 1, 81 = 5.482, p = .022, η
2
 = .063). Further analysis revealed that in a low load 
condition, the main effect of materialism was significant (F 1, 42 = 8.563, p = .006, η
2
 = .169), 
with means of 5.319 for low materialism and 6.699 for high materialism, supporting H6a. In a 
high load condition, the main effect of materialism was not significant (F 1, 39 = .074, p = .788, η
2
 
= .002). Please see Figure 2.22. 
 
Figure 2.22 
COGNITIVE LOAD X TRAIT (MATERIALISM) ON PREFERENCE 
 
There was a significant two-way interaction of materialism and cognitive load on 
preference. Under low cognitive load, the main effect of materialism was significant, resulting in 
trait (materialism) consistent preference. Under high cognitive load, the main effect of 
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materialism was not significant. The result indicates that under a high cognitive load, where 
relatively automatic processing take place, it is a non-conscious goal prime, in conjunction with a 
mood that affects preference, but not trait (e.g., materialism). Then, under a low cognitive load, 
where relatively deliberative, conscious processing takes place, one’s trait (e.g., materialism) 
may play more roles in shaping preference than a non-conscious goal prime.    
Materialism is an example of self-schema or cognitive representations about self that 
originates from experiences of the individual (Markus 1977). Although the self-schema matching 
paradigm suggests that an individual tends to form favorable attitudes toward messages or 
products consistent with self-schema or the individual’s personality characteristics, the 
mechanism of this effect is not clear; thus, the significance of its impact on persuasion is 
undetermined (Wheeler et al. 2005).  
One explanation for this phenomenon is that especially when an individual’s involvement 
is low, consistency between presented messages or objects and self-schema works as both 
positive cues and as heuristics, thereby improving the individual’s attitude towards the messages 
or objects (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Petty, Wheeler, and Bizer, 2000; Wheeler et al. 2005). 
Thus, when an individual with a high, frugal-spending self-schema is presented with frugal 
brands (i.e., self-schema matching), his or her favorability toward these brands are enhanced, 
resulting in a more favorable explicit attitude toward frugal brands than toward luxury brands.  
Similarly, an individual with a high materialism self-schema would prefer luxury brands 
to frugal brands, because luxury brands, instead of frugal brands, would match his or her self-
schema. However, under a high cognitive load, the goal prime, instead of the trait, should guide 
an individual’s preference or behavior.  Thus, only in a low cognitive load condition, where a 
goal prime may have less influence on an individual’s preference, a materialism trait should 
facilitate the trait-consistent preference.  
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2.6.13. Overall Implication (All Studies) 
 The effects of goal prime on both preference and implicit attitude were moderated by 
mood and cognitive load. However, the goal prime, mood, and cognitive load had no significant 
effects on explicit attitude. This indicates that the effect of goal prime on preference is 
sometimes mediated by an implicit attitude, rather than by an explicit attitude. 
 However, although we predicted that under a high cognitive load, the patterns of two-way 
interactions of mood and goal prime on implicit attitude and preference would be similar, this 
was not always true. Given a luxury goal prime under a high cognitive load, the effect of the goal 
prime on implicit attitude and preference lay in the opposite direction.  
 In addition, these studies were intended to test the effect of the goal prime, mood, and 
cognitive load on each dependent variable separately to see whether these manipulations had an 
impact not only on preference, but also on explicit or implicit attitudes. Thus, we did not test for 
a simultaneous effect of these manipulations on three dependent variables. We find that the 
effect of the goal prime becomes more pronounced under high cognitive load. Thus, in order to 
understand the effect of the goal prime and mood on both preference and implicit/explicit 





CHAPTER 3. ESSAY THREE 
3. 1. Introduction 
In Chapter 2, we found that the effect of goal primes on preference and implicit attitude is 
moderated by mood and cognitive load. However, goal primes do not affect explicit attitude. 
Since the effect of goal prime was more pronounced under a high cognitive load as predicted, 
Chapter 3 focuses on the high cognitive load condition. Extending Chapter 2, we investigate 
whether the effects of goal primes on preference are mediated by implicit attitude, rather than 
explicit attitude. Further, this chapter investigates the effect of the goal prime on preference in 
the context of decadent and wholesome food brand consumption.  
The effects of non-conscious goal primes on food preference is an important topic not 
only managerially, but also for society’s well-being. For example, 60 percent of Americans are 
considered obese or overweight (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, p. 7). As consumers become more 
health conscious, many companies are accelerating their efforts to develop healthier foods. For 
instance, PepsiCo hopes to triple the sales of healthier food within the next 10 years (Bymes, 
2010).  
Despite intentions to eat healthier foods, consumers often feel compelled to purchase 
unhealthy foods (Weijzen, Graaf, and Dijksterhuis, 2008). Also, social marketing that attempts to 
persuade people to eat healthy has not seen much success (Harker, Sharma, Harker, and 
Reinhard, 2010), resulting in a continuance of obesity and other health issues associated with 
eating unhealthy food.       
 In sum, we investigate how goal primes may result in prime-consistent preferences. In the 
context of consuming decadent vs. wholesome brands, we study (1) how goal primes non-
consciously guide preference; (2) how the goal prime preference relationship is mediated by 
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implicit attitude and explicit attitude; and (3) how mood affects implicit/explicit attitude and 
preference.  
3.2. CONSTRUCT DEFINITIONS 
3.2.1. Goal Prime 
Goal primes are associated with a non-conscious activation of a cognitive structure that 
includes the ideal state that an individual wishes to achieve, its means to reach that state, and its 
associated information (Laran, Jeniszewski, and Cunha Jr., 2008, Kruglanski et al. 2002, Shah 
and Kruglanski, 2003; Custers and Aarts, 2005). We employed two types of goal primes, a 
decadent and a wholesome goal prime. Whereas a decadent goal is associated with indulging 
oneself, a wholesome goal is associated with promoting the well-being of an individual 
(Merriam-Webster, 2010).  
3.2.2. Mood 
 Mood is defined as relatively long lasting general affective states without a particular 
referent (Linnenbrink and Pintrich, 2004, p58). In this study, we have two types of mood based 
on valence:  a positive mood vs. a negative mood. A positive mood includes such affective states 
as happy, pleased, and satisfied. A negative mood includes such affective states as unhappy, sad, 
and nervous (See Watson and Tellegen (1985) for the detailed description of mood structure).    
3.2.3. Cognitive Load 
Cognitive load is associated with the use of a working memory as a system, where task-
related information is maintained while conducting a certain task (Shah and Miyake, 1999). 
3.2.4. Implicit Attitude 
Implicit attitudes are evaluations that (a) are formed from an origin of which an 
individual is not aware; (b) are automatically activated; and (c) results in uncontrollable 
outcomes (Greenwald and Banaji, 1995, Wilson, Lindsey and Schooler, 2000). 
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3.2.5. Explicit Attitude 
An explicit attitude is defined as a conscious evaluative judgment about a certain object 
with a known origin (Gawronski and Bodenhausen, 2006).   
3.2.6. Preference 
 Preference is associated with the degree that an individual likes one alternative more than 
another alternative (Merriam-Webster, 2010). Whereas choice is discrete (e.g., the choice of one 
brand over another brand), preference is associated with the extent to which an individual likes 
one brand more than another brand.      
3.2.7. Self-Control 
Self-control is defined as “a capacity to change and adapt the self so as to produce a better, 
more optimal fit between self and world (e.g., Rothbaum et al., 1982) (c.f., Tangney, Baumeister, and 
Boone, 2004).” 
3.2.8. Category Combination 
In this study, a category combination refers to alternative combinations of categories in 
the IAT. One can combine luxury and positive (on the left) and frugal and negative (on the right) 
in Blocks 3 & 4, and then frugal and positive (on the left) and luxury and negative (on the right) 
in Blocks 6 & 7 (i.e., combination 1). Another alternative is to combine frugal and positive (on 
the left) and luxury and negative (on the right) in Blocks 3 & 4, and then luxury and positive (on 
the left) and frugal and negative (on the right) in Blocks 6 & 7 (i.e., combination 2).  
3.3. HYPOTHESES 
3.3.1. The Effect of Goal Prime on Preference 
3.3.1.1. Hypothesis 1 (Effect of Goal Prime on Preference)  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the automotive model (Bargh, 1990) suggests that 
environmental features not only activate consumer goals, but also cognition and behavior 
69 
 
without their awareness.  Thus, a supraliminal goal prime should first activate relevant goals 
(wholesome or decadent) and guide preferences toward wholesome or decadent brands. Prime 
words that are associated with either wholesome or decadent goals should activate related 
concepts, eventually activating higher order goals of wholesome or decadent. As the accessibility 
of the wholesome (decadent) goals increase, the preference for wholesome (decadent) brands 
should increase, resulting in a goal consistent preference.  
 
Figure 3.1 
PREDICTION FOR H1 (Study 1 & 2) 
The MODE model suggests that when individuals lack opportunity, they are more likely 
to employ automatic attitude-behavior processes regardless of motivation. Thus, when cognitive 
resources are limited (i.e., high cognitive load condition), an individual tends to follow automatic 
attitude-behavior processes. The term cognitive resources means the availability of working 
memory. Working memory refers to a system where task-related information is maintained while 
conducting a cognitive-task (Shah and Miyake 1999). In order to perform a certain task, working 
memory requires a certain amount of resources (Barrouillet, Bernardin, Portrat, Vergauwe, and 
Camos 2007). Therefore, an automatically activated goal may guide one’s behavior, such as 
brand preference when the availability of cognitive resources is limited. Thus,  
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H1: Under high cognitive load, consumers prefer brands consistent with the goal prime. 
(Please see Figure 3.1 for prediction.) 
3.3.1.2. Hypothesis 2 (Goal Activation vs. Semantic Cue Activation Explanations)  
Since the preference task in the study is hypothetical and not an actual choice, we do not 
expect a satiation effect with prime-consistent preference behavior. However, if the prime is only 
activating prime-related cues in associative networks, the trend of prime-consistent preference in 
repeated trials should diminish over time, due to memory decay. Thus, if the prime is activating a 
goal, prime-consistent preference should not have an order effect. However, if the prime is 
activating semantic cues, the effect of the prime should diminish over time and prime-consistent 
preference should have an order effect. Please see Figure 3.2 for prediction. Thus, similar to our 
prediction in Chapter 2, we have the following two competing hypotheses;                     
H2: Consumers under high cognitive load prefer brands consistent with the goal prime 
such that, (a, goal activation explanation) the effect is constant with repeated preference 
measures over time, or (b, semantic-cue activation explanation) the effect diminishes 
with repeated preference measures over time. 
 
Figure 3.2 
PREDICTION FOR H2 
3.3.2. Mediation Tests 
We will test the mediating roles of explicit attitude and implicit attitude on the 
relationship between the goal prime and preference. First, in Study 1, we will test the mediating 
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roles of implicit attitude on the relationship between the goal prime and preference (Please see 
Figure 3.3).  Then in Study 2, we will test the mediating roles of explicit attitude on the 
relationship between the goal prime and preference (Please see Figure 3.4). Subsequent 
discussions will introduce the path models and associated hypotheses for Study 1 and Study 2.   
3.3.2.1. Hypothesis 3 (The Direct Effect of Goal Prime on Preference) 
According to the theory of goal systems, where goals are considered part of the cognitive 
system, the goal prime should activate goals, resulting in an attitude consistent with the goal 
prime and then, lead to preference consistent with the attitude. Ferguson and Porter (2009) 
argued that the effect of the goal prime should be captured by the implicit attitude, but not by the 
explicit attitude. Thus, the effect of goal prime on preference should be fully mediated by 
implicit attitude (Study1). Thus, there is no direct effect of the goal prime on preference (See 
Figure 3.3).  









































However, explicit attitude should not mediate the effect of the goal prime on preference 
(Study 2). Instead, the goal prime should have a direct effect on preference (see Figure 3.4). Thus, 



















PATH MODEL (STUDY 2) 
3.3.2.2. Hypothesis 4 (The Effect of Goal Prime on Attitudes) 
Goals (i.e., a higher order more abstract goal than subordinate goals), subordinate goals, 
and means to achieve goals are mental representations, connected by associative links in memory 
(Kruglanski et al. 2002). As the automotive model suggests, when goals and their related 
environmental features are frequently and consistently associated with one another, these goals 
and environmental features are associatively linked together in memory (Bargh, 1990). Thus, as 
a goal prime non-consciously activates associated goals, it may also activate its means.  
In other words, to achieve a wholesome (decadent) goal, one needs to consume 
wholesome (decadent) food or brands. So, wholesome (decadent) goals may be linked together 


















implicit evaluation for its means should increase. Consistent with this notion, Ferguson and 
Bargh (2004) suggested that when one is pursuing a goal, one has a positive, implicit evaluation 
toward objects that are strongly related to the goals. Please see Figure 3.3 for prediction. Thus,  
H4a: Under a high cognitive load, an implicit attitude is consistent with the goal prime.  
Whereas activation of a goal may affect how one spontaneously evaluates goal-related 
objects, thereby resulting in a positive implicit attitude toward these objects, it should affect 
explicit evaluation less (Ferguson and Porter, 2009; Ferguson and Bargh 2004). Ferguson and 
Porter (2009) believed that motivational properties should be captured uniquely by implicit 
attitude, but not by explicit attitude. When one’s goal is non-consciously activated, one is not 
aware of pursuing a goal. Thus, the effect of a non-consciously activated goal on explicit attitude 
should be limited. Please see Figure 3.4 for prediction. Thus,   
H4b: Under a high cognitive load, an explicit attitude is unaffected by the goal prime.    
3.3.2.3. Hypothesis 5 (Explicit and Implicit Attitudes on Preference)  
The MODE model suggests that when opportunity is limited (e.g., limited cognitive 
capacity), automatically activated attitudes will guide judgment and behavior. Even when one’s 
motivation is high, consumers with low opportunity limit deliberative processing, where 
behavior is guided more by explicit attitude than by implicit attitude. Thus, regardless of one’s 
motivation, consumers with low opportunity employ automatically activated attitudes and 
behaviors. In this study, where all subjects are under high cognitive load, the preference for 
decadent brands over wholesome brands would be better guided by implicit attitude than by 
explicit attitude. Please see Figures 3.3 and 3.4. Thus,  
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H5: Under a high cognitive load, (a) implicit attitude has a positive effect on preference; 
(b) explicit attitude has a positive effect on preference; and (c) implicit attitude more strongly 
affects preference than an explicit attitude. 
3.3.2.4. Hypothesis 7 (The Effect of Mood on Preference) 
Studies suggest that individuals in negative moods lack self-control, thus abandoning 
healthy behaviors or wholesome eating behavior, since negative moods induce instant 
gratification (Tice, Bratslavsky, and Baumeister, 2001). Leith and Baumeister (1996) suggested 
that this is because individuals in negative moods tend to exhibit riskier behaviors than those in 
positive moods, hoping for better immediate outcomes (e.g., eating unhealthy, tasty food, hoping 
to improve the mood), but, such behavior frequently results in costly, long-term outcomes (e.g., 
getting unhealthy or gaining weight). Thus, an individual in a negative mood may prefer 
decadent brands to wholesome brands, compared to an individual in a positive mood. Please see 
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 for this prediction. An individual in a negative mood often fails to resist the 
temptation of immediate rewards (i.e., prefers decadent brands to wholesome brands) and 
thereby sacrifices the long-term benefits (i.e., staying healthy). Thus,          
H7: Under a high cognitive load, as mood decreases (more negative), the preference for 
decadent brands increases. 
3.3.2.5. Hypothesis 6 (The Effect of Mood on Attitude) 
An individual in a negative mood prioritizes immediate rewards (e.g., eating decadent, 
perhaps unhealthy food) over long-term benefits (e.g., staying healthy), more so than an 
individual in a positive mood. Thus, an individual in a negative mood may have more favorable 
implicit and explicit attitudes toward decadent brands than wholesome brands compared to an 
individual in a positive mood. Please see Figures 3.3 and 3.4. Thus,   
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H6: Under a high cognitive load, as mood decreases (more negative), (a) an implicit 
attitude for decadent brands increases; and (b) an explicit attitude for decadent brands 
increases. 
3.3.2.6. Hypothesis 8 (Order of the IAT Blocks) 
Messner and Vosgerau (2010) studied order effects in the administration of the IAT 
blocks on the IAT overall results. In the IAT, two categories (i.e., decadent and wholesome) are 
paired with either positive or negative words. For instance, Blocks 3 & 4 have wholesome and 
positive on the left, with decadent and negative on the right. These pairs are then switched in 
Blocks 6 & 7, with decadent and positive on the left and wholesome and negative on the right. 
Messner and Vosgerau (2010) argued that the order of this combination affects the response time 
of this categorization task. In other words, one can combine decadent and positive (on the left) 
and wholesome and negative (on the right) in Blocks 3 & 4, and then wholesome and positive 
(on the left) and decadent and negative (on the right) in Blocks 6 & 7 (i.e., we call this 
combination 1). Another alternative is to combine wholesome and positive (on the left) and 
decadent and negative (on the right) in Blocks 3 & 4, and then decadent and positive (on the left) 
and wholesome and negative (on the right) in Blocks 6 & 7 (i.e., we call this combination 2). In 
Blocks 6 & 7, a participant learns a new category combination that is inconsistent with that in 
Block 3 & 4.  Messner and Vosgerau (2010) argued that this new combination results in a slower 
response time in Blocks 6 & 7 than in Blocks 3 & 4, due to cognitive inertia. Whenever an 
individual learns a new rule that completely differs from a rule learned earlier, it takes more time 
to learn and follow that rule, due to cognitive inertia. Regardless of the compatibility of word 
pairing in either combination 1 or combination 2, the categorization task in Block 6 & 7 takes 
more time.  
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In combination 1, the tendency for longer response times for Blocks 6 & 7, compared to 
Blocks 3 & 4, results in stronger associations between decadent and positive, and between 
wholesome and negative, thus suggesting a stronger preference for decadent brands to 
wholesome brands, than a true preference.  For combination 2, the tendency for longer response 
times for Blocks 6 & 7 than Blocks 3 & 4 results in stronger associations between wholesome 
and positive, and between decadent and negative, suggesting a weaker preference of decadent 
brands to wholesome brands, than a true preference (Please see Figure 3.3).   
H8: Under a high cognitive load, compared to IAT combination 2, the IAT combination 
1 results in a more favorable implicit attitude toward decadent brands than toward 
wholesome brands. 
3.4 METHODS  
3.4.1. Design 
Subjects engage in multiple tasks on a computer to collect response latencies. A 2 (mood: 
positive, negative) by 2 (goal: wholesome, decadent) between-subject design is employed. All 
subjects are given the high-cognitive load task. In Study 1, the dependent variable was implicit 
attitude and preference. In Study 2, the dependent variable was explicit attitude and preference.  
3.4.2 Manipulations 
3.4.2.1. Mood 
Subjects were asked to recall the happiest or unhappiest event in each person’s life in an 
open-ended question. They were asked to describe the event as vividly as possible, including 
what happened on that day, and how the event made them feel. This mood manipulation was 
successfully used in several other studies (Schwarz and Clore, 1983: Fishbach and Labroo, 2007; 





Similar to the study in Essay 2, supraliminal priming is employed (Chartrand and Bargh, 
1996) to manipulate the goal by using different prime words. Subjects were given a scrambled 
sentence completion task. They constructed a grammatically correct four-word sentence from a 
five-word jumble. Among the twelve jumbles in total, ten jumbles contained a prime word 
associated with either a decadent goal or a wholesome goal. Prime words for the wholesome goal 
included nutritious, healthy, hearty, and others. Those for the decadent goal included luxury, rich, 
lavish, and others (See Tables 3.1 for the full list of prime words). For instance, from the five-
word jumble, “be will swear nutritious they,” subjects are expected to construct a grammatically 
correct sentence “they will be very nutritious.” (The prime word is italicized for illustration 
purposes; this was not the case in the actual experiment).      
3.4.2.3. Cognitive Load 
All subjects are given a high load condition and are asked to memorize an eight digit 
number. Subjects are asked to keep the number in mind throughout the experiment. At the end of 
the study, they are asked to recall the number by choosing the correct number from a given list.   
3.4.3 Measures 
3.4.3.1. Implicit Attitude 
The implicit association test (IAT) is employed as an implicit attitude measure. In IAT, 
subjects engage in two categorization tasks. We follow the same procedure employed in 
Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz (1998). Subjects are shown wholesome and decadent brand 
names, together with positive and negative words. First, the subjects are asked to categorize the 
word as either decadent or positive (located on left label), or as wholesome or negative (located 
on right label) (i.e., Task 1). When a brand name or a word is supposed to be categorized as 




SCRAMBLED SENTENCES FOR GOAL MANIPULATION  
Decadent Wholesome 
ball the throw toss silently 
be will swear rich they 
ate she it gourmet all 
he exquisite drops only seems 
somewhat lavish I was retired 
picked throw apples hardly the 
should now withdraw pleasure we 
they obedient him often meet 
luxury it hides there over 
is it fancy plant so 
send I mail it over 
extravagant alone very are they 
sky the seamless blue is 
food give keep decadent the 
him was indulgent it always 
ball the throw toss silently 
be will swear nutritious they 
ate she it well-being all 
he healthy drops only seems 
somewhat natural I was retired 
picked throw apples hardly the 
should now withdraw beneficial we 
they obedient him often meet 
wholegrain it hides there over 
is it pure plant so 
send I mail it over 
nourishing alone very are they 
sky the seamless blue is 
food give keep wholesome the 
him was hearty it always 
Note: Prime words are italicized only for illustration purposes in the table. 
 
Table 3.2 
SEQUENCE OF TRIAL BLOCKS IN THE IAT 
Block No. of 
Trials 
Functions Items assigned to left-key 
response 






























































Positive words +  
Decadent brand names 
 
Positive words +  
Decadent brand names 
 
Wholesome brand names 
 
 
Positive words + 
Wholesome brand names 
 
Positive words + 
Wholesome brand names 
 




Negative words + 
Wholesome brand names 
 
Negative words + 
Wholesome brand names 
 
Decadent brand names 
 
 
Negative words + 
Decadent brand names 
 
Negative words + 
Decadent brand names 
 
When a brand name or a word is supposed to be categorized as labels on the right (i.e., 
wholesome and negative), subjects are expected to push “I” on the key board. Next, they are 
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asked to categorize the word, either as wholesome or positive (located on left label), or as 
decadent or negative (located on right label) (i.e., Task 2). The response times for these 
categorization tasks are measured to compute the average response times for these two tasks.  
When an individual’s association between decadent (wholesome) brands and positive 
(negative) words is stronger than that between decadent (wholesome) brands and negative 
(positive) words, we assume that the average response time for Task 1 is shorter than that for 
Task 2. Thus, when the average response time for Task 2 minus the average response time for 
Task 1 is positive, we can assume that this individual has a preference for decadent brands over 
wholesome brands.  
Messner and Vosgerau (2009) argued that researchers should take order effects into 
consideration in the IAT. In the IAT, two categories (e.g., wholesome and decadent) are paired 
with either positive or negative words. For instance, Blocks 3 & 4 have wholesome and positive 
on the left and decadent and negative on the right. These pairs are then switched in Blocks 6 & 7, 
with decadent and positive on the left and wholesome and negative on the right.  Messner and 
Vosgerau (2009) argued that the order of this combination affects the response time of this 
categorization task. In other words, we can combine decadent and positive (on the left) and 
wholesome and negative (on the right) in Blocks 3 & 4, and then wholesome and positive (on the 
left) and decadent and negative (on the right) in Blocks 6 & 7 (i.e., we call this combination 1). 
Another alternative is to combine wholesome and positive (on the left) and decadent and 
negative (on the right) in Blocks 3 & 4, and then decadent and positive (on the left) and 
wholesome and negative (on the right) in Blocks 6 & 7 (i.e., we call this combination 2). In 
Blocks 6 & 7, a participant learns a new category combination that is inconsistent with that in 
Blocks 3 & 4 which, Messner and Vosgerau (2009) argued, results in a slower response time in 
Blocks 6 & 7 than in Blocks 3 & 4.  This effect should be observed, regardless of the 
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compatibility of the category combination. Thus, the argument goes somewhat against the 
previous discussion about the compatible and incompatible tasks. In order to account for such 
order effects, we counterbalanced these two types of categorization (i.e., combination 1 and 
combination 2).   
An implicit attitude will be computed following the algorithm developed by Greenwald, 
Nosek, and Banaji (2003).  Among the data from seven blocks (see Table 15 for the detail of 
each block), the analysis will utilize data only from Blocks 3, 4, 6, and 7. First, data considered 
as outliers will be eliminated; this would include a trial where the response latency is beyond 
10,000 ms or trials where the responses are less than 300ms, accounting for more than 10% of 
trials.  
The former will be eliminated because one single trial is unlikely to take more than 
10,000 ms if a subject is paying full attention to the task. Thus, it is possible that a subject is 
engaged in another, unrelated task (e.g., thinking of something else). The latter is eliminated 
because trials with less than 300ms latencies are more likely to be considered as random 
responses (i.e., not following the instructions).   
After this treatment, the mean for correct response latencies for each block will be 
calculated. One standard deviation for all trials of Blocks 3 and 6, and another standard deviation 
for all trials of Blocks 4 and 7 will be computed. Response latencies for incorrect answers will be 
replaced with the block mean (previously computed), plus 600ms.  Then, for each block (i.e., 
Blocks 3, 4, 6 and 7), we average the response latencies, including the original latency for correct 
responses, as well as the replaced latency for incorrect responses, thus resulting in Mb3 Mb4 Mb6 
and Mb7. Then, we compute the differences between Mb6 and Mb3 (Mb6 - Mb3) and between Mb7 
and Mb4 (Mb7 - Mb4).  Then, we divide each value by its standard deviation, resulting in (Mb6 - 
Mb3) /(SD b6&b3) and (Mb7 - Mb4) /(SD b7&b4).  Finally, we average the two values.   
81 
 
3.4.3.2. Explicit Attitude 
For explicit attitude measures, 9-point scales (good vs. bad, like vs. dislike, and favorable 
vs. unfavorable) were used to measure explicit attitude for each brand (frugal or luxury). 
Subjects evaluated five wholesome brands and five decadent brands, one at a time. Subjects 
chose one to indicate an unfavorable attitude (i.e., bad, dislike, unfavorable) and chose nine to 
indicate a favorable attitude (i.e., good, like, and favorable). Summated scales for three items 
were computed both for wholesome brands and decadent brands. Then a factor score was 
computed for the five wholesome brands, resulting in one component. Another factor score was 
computed for the five decadent brands, resulting in one component. Finally, the factor score for 
wholesome brands was subtracted from the factor score for luxury brands.  
3.4.3.3. Preference 
Subjects were asked to indicate preference between two brands (one wholesome and 
another decadent) in several product categories for ten pairs of brands. Thus, there were ten 
decadent brands and ten wholesome brands. As may be seen in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, half of these 
brands (i.e., five decadent and five wholesome brands) were the same brands used either in the 
explicit attitude measures in Study 2 or the implicit attitude measure in Study 1. The other half of 
these brands was only used in the preference task. The latter half of these brands was added to 
minimize the order effect between the preference task and the IAT/explicit attitude task, but was 
not used in the analysis, except for the order analysis. In the order analysis (see Table 3.8), we 
needed to analyze all the brands from the first
 
preference task to the tenth preference task. Thus, 
the entire ten pairs of wholesome and decadent brands were used for the analysis.  
For five pairs of brands, subjects responded to “1” when they preferred the wholesome 
brand, “5” when their preference for two brands was indifferent, or “9” when they preferred the 
decadent brand. For the other five pairs of brands, subjects selected “1” when they preferred the 
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decadent brand, “5” when their preference for two brands was indifferent, or “9” when they 
preferred the wholesome brand. Preference scores for the latter five pairs of brands were 
reversed. That is, in the analysis, “1” indicates a preference for frugal brands, while “9” indicates 
a preference for decadent brands over frugal brands.    
3.4.3.4. Mood 
Four items with 9-point scales (irritable vs. pleased, sad vs. happy, depressed vs. cheerful, 
and bad mood vs. good mood) were used to measure mood.   
3.4.3.5. Trait (Self-control) 
We employed a brief version of the self-control trait measures from Tangney, Baumeister, 
and Boone (2004). Self-control is “widely regarded as a capacity to change and adapt the self so 
as to produce a better, more optimal fit between self and world” (e.g., Rothbaum et al., 1982) 
(c.f., Tangney, Baumeister, and Boone, 2004). 
3.4.3.6. Cognitive Load 
 At the end of each study, participants were asked to select the 8-digit number shown in 
the beginning of the study (i.e., 89532316) among a list of nine numbers.         
3.4.4 Material Pretests 
3.4.4.1. Pretest 1: Selecting Brands  
 A pretest was conducted to choose brands considered to be either decadent or wholesome. 
Fifty undergraduate students completed the pretest. One group was asked to evaluate 35 
potentially wholesome brands and another group was asked to evaluate 35 potentially decadent 
brands. These participants were asked to evaluate each brand in terms of the level of association 
with four words: “wholesome,” “decadent,” “familiarity” and “positivity.” For each brand, 
participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with the following statements: 
(1) ---- is “wholesome”, (2) --- is “decadent,” (3) --- is “familiar,” and (4) Overall, I have a 
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positive attitude towards ----.  The scale was a 9-point item from 1, strongly disagree to 9, 
strongly agree.   
Then, ten wholesome brands with means above mid-point in wholesome association 
(mean ranged from 6.75 to 7.71), and ten decadent brands with the means at least above the mid-
point in decadent association (mean ranged from 5.12 to 6.47) were selected. Repeated measures 
ANOVA revealed that wholesome brands were rated as more wholesome (M=7.089) than 
decadent brands (M=4.833) (F 1, 50 = 19.570, p < .001, η
2
 = .281).  All brands were relatively 
familiar and positive, with the mean above a mid-point of five. Decadent brands selected include 
Ben & Jerry’s, Starbucks, Haagen-Dazs, Dove-Chocolate, Coke, and others (Please see Tables 
3.3 for the decadent brand names and detailed results).  Wholesome brands selected included 
Cheerios, V8, Special-K, Nature Valley, Quaker Oats and others. Please see Tables 3.4 for the 
wholesome brand names and detailed results.  
Table 3.3 
Pretest Results: Brand Name Association for Decadent Brands 
 Decadent Wholesome Familiarity Positive Category 
Ben & Jerry’s                               6.47 5.97 7.24 7.03 At. and Pref. 
Haagen-Dazs 6.26 5.59 5.76 6.06 At. and Pref. 
Godiva 6.06 5.24 5.71 6.24 At. and Pref. 
Snickers 6.03 5.94 8.35 7.32 At. and Pref. 
Pepperidge Farm 
Cookie 
5.59 5.88 6.50 6.65 At. and Pref. 
Wolfgang Puck 5.12 5.06 5.09 5.26 Only Pref. 
Starbucks 6.47 6.15 8.24 6.85 Only Pref. 
Coke 6.21 6.24 8.71 7.91 Only Pref. 
Krispy Kreme 5.53 4.62 7.44 6.00 Only Pref. 
Wonka 5.32 5.15 6.76 6.26 Only Pref. 
Note: 9 point scale: 1, Strongly Disagree to 9, Strongly Agree. At.: Used in Attitude Measure. 
Pref.: Used in Preference Measure. 
3.4.4.2. Pretest 2: Generating Prime Words 
 Another pretest was conducted to generate prime words for the goal manipulation 




Pretest Results: Brand Name Association for Wholesome Brands    
 Wholesome Decadent Familiarity Positive Category 
Dannon 6.89 5.36 7.18 7.00 At. and Pref. 
Yoplait 6.71 5.36 6.86 7.00 At. and Pref. 
Cheerios 7.71 5.25 7.96 7.64 At. and Pref. 
Quaker Oats 7.29 4.89 7.50 7.32 At. and Pref. 
Fiber One 6.68 5.18 5.96 5.61 At. and Pref. 
Healthy Choice 6.89 5.36 6.54 6.36 Only Pref. 
V8 7.64 5.79 7.64 7.04 Only Pref. 
Dole 6.93 5.57 7.46 7.25 Only Pref. 
Kashi 6.61 4.93 5.04 5.68 Only Pref. 
Special K 7.54 5.86 7.39 7.25 Only Pref. 
Note: 9 point scale: 1, Strongly Disagree to 9, Strongly Agree. At.: Used in Attitude Measure. 
Pref.: Used in Preference Measure. 
for two given words (i.e., wholesome and decadent). They were asked to list a set of five words 
associated with wholesome, as well as another set of five words associated with decadent. We 
also selected a series of words from the free association norms database provided by Nelson, 
McEvoy and Schreiber (1998). This database provides results from free word association tests 
for many words, including healthy, luxury, rich, elegant, and others. We also selected some 
synonyms of wholesome and decadent.  In this way, we constructed a list of 30 prime words for 
wholesome and decadent goals.    
3.4.4.3. Pretest 3: Validating Prime Words 
 In the subsequent Pretest 3, another set of participants, forty-six undergraduate students, 
evaluated the prime words, generated in Pretest 2, on its valence and on its strength of 
association with either “wholesome” or “decadent.” Finally, we have selected ten prime words 
for each “wholesome” and “decadent” goal prime. The prime words for the “decadent” goal 
included luxury, rich, lavish, fancy, extravagant, exquisite, indulgent, pleasure, gourmet, and 
sophisticated. The participants rated these prime words as associated with “decadent,” with the 
means ranging from 6.28 to 6.83 on a 9-point scale (1, Not at all associated with "Decadent" to 9, 
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Strongly associated with "Decadent"). The ten prime words were rated as positive with the 
means ranging from 6.5 to 8 on a 9 point scale (1, negative to 9, positive). Please see Table 3.5 
for the detail. 
Table 3.5 
PRIME WORDS FOR DECADENT GOAL (N=46) 
Prime Words Mean * Standard Error Valence 
Luxury 6.83 0.28 7.41 
Rich 6.70 0.32 7.04 
Lavish 6.70 0.28 6.50 
Fancy 6.67 0.25 6.78 
Extravagant 6.67 0.27 6.67 
Exquisite 6.65 0.27 7.80 
Indulgent 6.52 0.31 6.17 
Pleasure 6.46 0.24 8.00 
Gourmet 6.41 0.32 7.39 
Sophisticated 6.28 0.32 7.33 
Note: * 9 point scale (1: Not at all associated with Decadent, 9: Strongly associated with 
Decadent) 
The prime words for wholesome were nutritious, healthy, hearty, nourishing, wholegrain, 
well-being, natural, pure, beneficial, and well-rounded. The participants rated these primes words 
as relatively associated with “wholesome,” with means ranging from 3.52 to 2.50 on a 9 point 
scale (1, strongly associated with "Wholesome," to 9, not at all associated with "Wholesome."  
The ten prime words were rated as positive with the means ranging from 7.00 to 8.26 on a 9-
point scale (1, negative to 9, positive). Please see Table 3.6 for the detail. Repeated measures 
ANOVA revealed that decadent prime words were rated more decadent (M=6.589) than 
wholesome prime words (M=3.035) (F 1, 45 = 168.506, p < .001, η
2
 = .789).  
3.4.5. Procedures 
A few days before the main study, subjects completed an online study about their traits, 
including self-control trait. Then, they engaged in a series of tasks in a computer lab. The study 
was administered with E-prime software, thus allowing a collection of response times. First, 
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subjects completed a mood manipulation task. After completing the task, subjects were asked to 
indicate how this task made them feel (1 = very unhappy to 9 = very happy). Second, all subjects 
were given a high cognitive load task. Third, subjects completed the scrambled sentence task that 
worked as supraliminal primes.  Fourth, subjects engaged in preference tasks. Next, subjects 
answered either explicit attitude measures (in Study 2) or implicit attitude measures (Study 1).  
Table 3.6 
PRIME WORDS FOR WHOLESOME GOAL (N=46) 
Prime Words Mean *2 Standard Error Valence 
Nutritious 2.5 0.17 8.17 
Healthy 2.54 0.21 8.26 
Hearty 2.76 0.26 7.30 
Nourishing 2.83 0.23 7.98 
Wholegrain 3.17 0.23 7.00 
Well-being 3.22 0.23 7.72 
Natural 3.24 0.22 7.63 
Pure 3.26 0.26 7.85 
Beneficial 3.3 0.23 7.89 
Well-rounded 3.52 0.25 7.65 
Note:* 9 point scale (1: Strongly associated with Wholesome, 9: Not at all associated with 
Wholesome), Valence: 9 point scale (1: Negative, 9: Positive) 
We used five pairs of brands (five wholesome and five decadent brands) in both attitude 
and preference measures. In order to minimize the order effects (attitude and preference), the 
preference measure also included another five pairs of brands (five wholesome and five decadent 
brands), not used in attitude measure (i.e., non-target brands). Then, subjects were asked to recall 
the eight-digit number that they were asked to remember in the beginning of the study.  
3.5. ANALYSIS 
3.5.1. Preliminary Checks 
3.5.1.1. Reliability 
The four-item, 9-point scale, was used to measure how the description of happy events 
made respondents feel (1, very unhappy to 9, very happy). Cronbach's Alphas were .927 for 
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Study 1, and .966 for Study 2. Also, thirteen items with a 9-point scale were used to measure 
self-control (1=less self-control to 9=more self-control). Cronbach's Alphas were .880 for Study 
1 and .784 for Study 2. 
3.5.1.2. Manipulation and Confound Check (Study 1) 
Participants who described a happy event reported a significantly more positive mood (M 
= 6.588) than those who described an unhappy event (M = 3.715) (F 64 = 63.107, p < .001, η
2 
= .496). The goal prime manipulation did not have a significant effect on the mood measure (F 64 
= 1.408, p =.240, η
2 
= .022).  
The trait measure (i.e., self-control) was measured prior to the main study. The goal 
prime had no significant effect on the self-control measure (F 64 = 2.823, p =.098, η
2 
= .042). 
Neither did the mood manipulation have a significant effect on self-control (F 64 = .034, p =.855, 
η
2 
= .001). Also, sixty among sixty-eight participants correctly recognized the number (i.e., 
89532316) shown in the beginning of the study.   
3.5.1.3. Manipulation and Confound Check (Study 2) 
Participants who described a happy event reported a significantly more positive mood (M 
= 6.485) than those who described an unhappy event (M = 3.287) (F 62 = 71.785, p < .001, η
2 
= .537). However, as expected, the goal prime manipulation did not have a significant effect on 
the mood measure (F 62 = .332, p =.566, η
2 
= .005). Similarly, the goal prime manipulation had 
no significant effect on the mood measure (F 62 = 1.233, p =.271, η
2 
= .019). 
Again, the trait measure (i.e., self-control) was measured prior to the main study. The 
goal prime did not have a significant effect on self-control (F 62 = 1.949, p =.168, η
2 
= .030). 
Neither did the mood manipulation have a significant effect on self-control (F 62 = .113, p =.738, 
η
2 
= .002). Also, fifty-nine among sixty-six participants correctly recognized the number (i.e., 
89532316) shown in the beginning of the study.   
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3.5.1.4. Outlier Analysis 
In Study 1, no subjects reported a connection between the goal manipulation and the 
preference, or the IAT tasks. In Study 2, two of the sixty-eight subjects reported a connection 
between the goal manipulation and the preference or explicit attitude tasks. To avoid any 
possibility that the goal was consciously activated, these subjects were removed from the 
analysis. Thus, the analysis for Study 2 was conducted with sixty-six subjects.   
3.5.2. Study 1 & Study 2 (Preference) 
3.5.2.1. Hypothesis 1: Goal Prime on Preference  
An analysis of variance was conducted to assess the effect of mood and goal prime on 
preference. Preference was a common measure in Study 1 and Study 2. There were no significant 
differences between Studies 1 and 2 on preference: no main effect of study (F 1, 125 = 2.496, p 
= .117, η
2
 = .020) and no interaction effects (p > .05). Thus, the data were collapsed. The 
dependent variable was preference for the decadent brand compared to the wholesome brand. In 
the analysis, prior to forming a factor score, 1 indicates a preference for frugal brands, and 9 
indicates a preference for decadent brands on a 9-point scale.  
These preference scores for five pairs of brands (i.e., five wholesome brands and five 
decadent brands) were used to compute a factor score. In the computed factor score, a negative 
score indicates preference for the wholesome brands; 0 indicates indifferent preference between 
the wholesome and the decadent brands; and a positive score indicates preference for the 
decadent brands. The between-subject factors were mood (positive vs. negative) and goal prime 
(decadent vs. wholesome). Self-control was used as covariate. Please see Table 3.7 for the 
ANOVA results. The main effect of goal prime on preference was significant (M = .158 for the 





= .048), supporting H1. The main effect of mood on preference was not significant (F 1, 125 = .324, 
p = .570, η
2
 = .003). Please see Figure 3.5 for the result.    
Table 3.7 
ANOVA RESULTS ON PREFERENCE 
(STUDIES 1 & 2) (N = 134) 
 
 df F p-value η
2
 
Trait (Self-control) 1 3.191 .076 .025 
Mood 1 .324 .570 .003 
Goal 1 6.274 .014 .048 
Study 1 2.496 .117 .020 
Mood x Goal 1 1.338 .250 .011 
Mood x Study 1 .189 .664 .002 
Goal x Study 1 .072 .788 .001 
Mood x Goal x Study 1 .355 .552 .003 




ACTUAL FOR H1 (STUDIES 1 & 2) 
The two-way interaction between mood and goal prime on preference was not significant 
(F 1, 125 = 1.338, p = .250, η
2
 = .011). However, further analysis revealed that in a negative mood, 
an individual with a decadent goal prime preferred decadent brands (M = .206), while an 
individual with a wholesome goal prime preferred wholesome brands (M = -.416) (F 1, 60 = 6.999, 
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p = .010, η
2
 = .104). However, in a positive mood, the means were not statistically different (F 1, 
64 = .720, p = .399, η
2
 = .011). Further analysis revealed that preference toward decadent brands 
over wholesome brands was indifferent to mood, either under the decadent goal prime (F 1, 59 
= .130, p = .720, η
2
 = .002) or under the wholesome goal prime (F 1, 65 = 1.711, p = .195, η
2
 
= .026). Please see Figure 3.6 for the result.  
3.5.2.2. Hypothesis 2: Goal and Brand Order on Preference  
Repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to assess the effect of brand order, mood, 
and goal prime on preference. In the order analysis, we needed to analyze all the brands from the 
first
 
preference task to the tenth preference task. Thus, all ten pairs of wholesome and decadent 
brands were used for the analysis, whereas only five pairs of wholesome and decadent brands, 
common either in explicit or implicit attitude measures, were used in the other analysis (e.g., 
testing H1). In the analysis, 1 indicates a preference for frugal brands, while 9 indicates a 
preference for decadent brands, using a 9-point scale. A factor score was not computed in this 
order analysis.  
 
Figure 3.6 
MOOD X GOAL ON PREFERENCE (STUDY 1 & 2) 
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The following interactions, as the primary interests of this analysis, were not significant; 
that is, between brand order and study (Study 1 vs. Study 2) (F 1, 125 = .669, p = .415, η
2
 = .005), 
between goal prime and study (F 1, 125 = .024, p = .877, η
2
 = .000), and among goal prime, study, 
and brand order (F 1, 125 = .836, p = .362, η
2
 = .007). Thus, although the main effect of study on 
preference was significant (F 1, 125 = 6.598, p = .011, η
2
 = .050), the data for Study 1 and Study 2 
were collapsed in this analysis. 
As expected, an individual with a decadent goal prime (M=5.813) preferred toward 
decadent brands to wholesome brands more than an individual with a wholesome goal prime 
(M=5.268) (F 1, 125 = 5.890, p = .017, η2 = .045). However, the two way interaction of brand 
order and goal prime on preference was not significant (F 1, 125 = .669, p = .415, η2 = .005). This 
may be an indication that the prime words are activating a goal rather than prime-related 
associative cues, supporting H2a and rejecting H2b. As the interaction between goal prime and 
mood on preference (F 1, 125 = .701, p = .404, η
2
 = .006), and the interaction between brand order, 
goal prime, and mood on preference (F 1, 125 = .533, p = .467, η
2
 = .004) were not significant, the 
main effect of goal and the interaction of goal and brand order on preference should be 
unaffected by mood. Please see Figure 3.7 and Table 3.8 for the result.   
 
Figure 3.7 
ACTUAL FOR H2 
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3.5.3. Study 1 
3.5.3.1. Hypotheses 3a, 4a, 5a, 6a, and 7 
Path analysis, a form of general linear model (Karlin, Cameron, Chakraborty, 1983), was 
conducted to simultaneously assess the effect of mood, category combination, and goal on 
implicit attitude and preference (Please see Figure 3.8). Please see Graham 2008 for the use of 
categorical data in the general linear model. The analysis revealed that goal prime (1 = 
wholesome and 2 = decadent) positively and significantly affected implicit attitude toward 
decadent brands over wholesome brands (β = .231, p=.028), supporting H4a. The direct effect of 
goal prime on preference was not statistically significant (β = .174, p = .134), supporting H3a. As 
expected, implicit attitude positively affected preference (β = .279, p=.016), supporting H5a.  
Table 3.8 
Repeated Measures of ANOVA Results on Preference for Brand Order Analysis  
(Study 1 & 2) (N = 134) 
 df   F p-value η2 
Brand Order 1 .932 .336 .007 
Brand Order x Trait (Self-
control) 
1 1.028 .313 .008 
Brand Order x Mood 1 1.023 .314 .008 
Brand Order x Goal 1 .669 .415 .005 
Brand Order x Study 1 .791 .376 .006 
Brand Order x Mood x 
Goal 
1 .533 .467 .004 
Brand Order x Mood x 
Study 
1 .763 .384 .006 
Brand Order x Goal x 
Study 
1 .836 .362 .007 
Brand Order x Mood x 
Goal x Study 
1 .866 .354 .007 
Trait (Self-control) 1 4.979 .027 .038 
Mood 1 .051 .821 .000 
Goal 1 5.890 .017 .045 
Study 1 6.598 .011 .050 
Mood x Goal 1 .701 .404 .006 
Mood x Study 1 1.587 .210 .013 
Goal x Study 1 .024 .877 .000 
Mood x Goal x Study 1 .103 .749 .001 
Note: All tests reported are two-tailed. 
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Further path analysis revealed that mood was not a good predictor of either implicit attitude (β 
= .057, p=.586) or preference (β = -.129, p=.256), rejecting H6a and H7. (Please see Figure 3.8 











PATH MODEL (ACTUAL FOR STUDY 1) 
 
3.5.3.2. Hypothesis 8 
Path analysis revealed that a category combination (1=combination 1; 2=combination 2) 
is negatively associated with implicit attitude (β = -.447, p<.001), supporting H8. This is an 
indication that combination 1 resulted in a better implicit attitude toward decadent brands than 
for combination 2. A multivariate analysis of variance was conducted to confirm the effect of a 
category combination on implicit attitude (Please see Table 16 for the results).  
A category combination affects implicit attitude, where consumers had more positive 
attitudes toward wholesome brands in combination 1 (M = .072) and more positive attitudes 
toward decadent brands in combination 2 (M = -.547) (F 1, 59 = 15.942, p <.001, η
2
 = .213), 






















significant interactions with the goal (F 1, 59 = .312, p = .579, η
2
 = .005), or mood (F 1, 59 = 2.191, 
p =.144, η
2
 = .036), the effect of category combination on implicit attitude was consistent 





















PATH MODEL (ACTUAL FOR STUDY 2) 
3.5.4. Study 2 
3.5.4.1. Hypotheses 3b, 4b, 5b, 6b, 7 
Path analysis was conducted to simultaneously assess the effect of mood and goal on 
explicit attitude and preference. The analysis revealed that the goal prime had no significant 
effect on explicit attitude (β = .105, p = .395), supporting H4b. Goal prime had no significant 
effect on preference (β = .122, p = .139), rejecting H3b. Explicit attitude was a good predictor of 
preference (β = .726, p <.001), supporting H5b. Although we have predicted that implicit attitude 
has a stronger relationship with preference than explicit attitude, this was not supported. 
Comparison of standardized regression weights reveals that explicit attitude has a stronger 

















rejecting H5c. Mood was not a good predictor of either explicit attitude (β = .045, p = 712) or 
preference (β = -.049, p = .549), rejecting both H6b and H7. Please see Figure 3.9 and Table 3.10 
for the result.   
Table 3.9 
MANOVA RESULTS FOR STUDY 1 
 df F p-value η2 
Preference (Dependent Variable)     
Trait(Self-control) 1 1.224 .273 .020 
Mood 1 .831 .366 .014 
Goal 1 2.884 .095 .047 
Category Combination 1 .103 .749 .002 
Mood x Goal 1 2.406 .126 .039 
Mood x Category Combination 1 2.206 .143 .036 
Goal x Category Combination 1 1.575 .214 .026 
Mood x Goal x Category Combination 1 .227 .635 .004 
 
Implicit Attitude (Dependent Variable)     
Trait(Self-control) 1 .003 .957 .000 
Mood 1 .237 .628 .004 
Goal 1 4.511 .038 .071 
Category Combination 1 15.942 .000 .213 
Mood x Goal 1 .129 .720 .002 
Mood x Category Combination 1 2.191 .144 .036 
Goal x Category Combination 1 .312 .579 .005 
Mood x Goal x Category Combination 1 .156 .695 .003 
Note: All tests reported are two-tailed. 
3.6 Discussion 
3.6.1. Hypothesis 1 
 As we have predicted, consumers preferred brands consistent with the goal prime. 
Although the interaction of mood and goal prime on preference was not significant, there was a 
slight goal-approach tendency in a negative mood, implied by the significant main effect of the 
goal prime (F 1, 125 = 6.999, p = .010, η
2
 = .104) in a negative mood (M=.206 for decadent prime; 
M=-.416 for wholesome prime), but not in a positive mood, (F 1, 125 = .720, p = .399, η
2
 = .011). 
This approach tendency of negative mood is consistent with the notion that negative emotion 
(e.g., anger) facilitates goal-approach tendencies, rather than goal-avoidance tendencies (e.g., 
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Aarts, Custers, and Holland, 2007, p. 176, Carver, 2004). Please see Table 3.10 for the 
MANOVA results. 
These findings conflict with some studies (e.g., Fishbach and Labroo, 2007) that suggest 
an individual in a positive mood tends to approach the goal while an individual in a negative 
mood tends to avoid the goal. Thus, under high cognitive load, where opportunity is low, an 
individual in a positive mood should approach the goal, resulting in goal-consistent behavior. In 
contrast, an individual in a negative mood should avoid the goal, and thus brand preference is not 
affected by the goal prime. Results from Essay 2 support this argument (Please see 3.6.9. 
General Discussion for explanation of these seemingly conflicting results). 
Table 3.10 
MANOVA RESULTS FOR STUDY 2 
 df F p-value η2 
Preference (Dependent Variable)     
Trait(Self-control) 1 1.860 .178 .030 
Mood 1 .005 .944 .000 
Goal 1 3.312 .074 .051 
Mood x Goal 1 .191 .664 .003 
 
Explicit Attitude (Dependent 
Variable) 
    
Trait(Self-control) 1 .958 .332 .015 
Mood 1 .166 .685 .003 
Goal 1 .989 .324 .016 
Mood x Goal 1 .187 .667 .003 
Note: All tests reported are two-tailed. 
 
3.6.2. Hypothesis 2 
 The effect of the goal prime on preference was indifferent to brand order. If the goal 
prime was merely triggering semantic activation, the effect of the goal prime should diminish 
after exposure to a prime (Higgins, 1996). Thus, the results suggest that the prime was activating 
a goal. This is because an activated goal (e.g., hunger) is believed to maintain its effect until it is 
fulfilled (e.g., by eating lunch) (Aarts, Gollwitzer, and Hassin, 2004). In order to clearly 
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understand this possible diminishing effect of semantic activation, some researchers include filler 
tasks after the goal manipulation, yet before subjects engage in the behavioral task (e.g., choice 
task or preference task).  
3.6.3. Hypotheses 3a, 4a, and 5a 
 The path analysis supported H3a, H4a and H5a. This indicates that goal consistent 
preference was mediated by implicit attitude. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study 
that empirically found that the goal consistent preference is mediated by implicit attitude, using 
the IAT in a consumer consumption context. Some researchers may argue that the goal prime 
was merely activating semantic cues, resulting in mediation by implicit attitude and prime-
consistent preference.  However, the empirical support for H2a (goal activation) instead of H2b 
(semantic activation) rejects this explanation.  
 The mediating role of implicit attitude on prime-consistent preference is well explained 
by the goal system theory. As the goal system theory indicates, semantic activation and goal 
activation may not differ from each other.  If goals, subordinate-goals, and their means are 
represented similarly to semantic cues in memory, a goal prime may activate a goal and 
associated cues, resulting in prime-consistent implicit attitude and prime-consistent preference. 
Thus, there is no direct effect of goal prime on preference, thus supporting H3a. 
If semantic construct activation is “passive with no motivational properties” (Bargh et el. 
2001, Dijksterhuis and Bargh 2001, c.f., Sela and Shiv, 2009), where cognitive systems and 
motivational systems are considered two distinct systems, successful goal activation should not 
be mediated by implicit attitude. In such a case, goal activation by the goal prime should directly 
lead to a prime-consistent preference with no effect on either implicit or explicit attitudes. 
Supporting H3a with no direct effect of the goal prime on implicit attitude rejects the view that 
motivation and cognitive systems are two different systems.   
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3.6.4. Hypotheses 6a and 7  
 Neither H6a nor H7 was supported. We predicted that an individual in a negative mood 
lacks self-control, resulting in preference toward immediate rewards (e.g., try to feel better by 
eating tasty, but unhealthy, decadent food) rather than long-term rewards (e.g., staying fit and 
healthy). However, the main effect of mood on implicit attitude and preference was not observed 
in our study.  
It may be the case that the goal of maintaining or improving mood was not accessible; 
thus, an individual in a negative mood would not feel better by prioritizing immediate rewards 
over long-term rewards. Instead, subjects approached a given goal prime, resulting in goal 
consistent attitude or goal consistent preference, regardless of mood. This finding is somewhat 
consistent with Fishbach and Labroo (2007).          
3.6.5. Hypothesis 8 
 As noted, the means for implicit attitude in IAT combination 1 and in IAT combination 2 
were .072 and -.542, respectively. For combination 1, decadent and positive (categories on the 
left), wholesome and negative (categories on the right) combination was administered first in 
Steps 3 & 4, and switched later in Steps 6 & 7. In combination 2, wholesome and positive 
(categories on the left), decadent and negative (categories on the right) combination administered 
first in Steps 3 & 4, and switched later in Steps 6 & 7. This support of H8 indicates that IAT 
combination 1 resulted in a better implicit attitude toward decadent brands over wholesome 
brands than IAT combination 2.   
These findings are consistent with Messner and Vosgerau’s (2010) argument that  it 
requires effort for an individual to learn a new category combination in Steps 6 & 7, one 
different from a previously learned category combination in Steps 3 & 4. Thus in the IAT, 
response times for Steps 6 & 7 should be consistently longer than for Steps 3 & 4. Consistent 
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with Messner and Vosgerau (2010), subjects preferred decadent brands in combination 1, and 
wholesome brands in combination 2.  
While the mean of implicit attitude for combination 1 was positive (i.e., .072), the mean 
of implicit attitude for combination 2 was negative (i.e., -.542). While the positive number 
suggests a more favorable implicit attitude toward the decadent brand over the wholesome brand, 
the negative number suggests a more favorable attitude toward wholesome brands over a 
decadent brand. Thus, it is important to counterbalance the combination of categories in the IAT.        
3.6.6. Hypotheses 3b, 4b, and 5b  
In path analysis, the direct effect of the supraliminal goal prime on preference was not 
significant, rejecting H3b. However, the MANOVA revealed that a goal prime had a significant 
goal consistent effect on preference (P=.037
1
). This suggests that the combination of the direct 
effect, and the indirect effect through implicit attitude, of goal prime on preference was 
significant. As expected, the goal prime did not have a significant effect on explicit attitude, thus 
supporting H4b. Also, as expected, an explicit attitude had a positive and significant effect on 
preference, thus supporting H5b. Therefore, the effect of goal prime on preference was not 
mediated by an explicit attitude.  
Although we predicted that under high-cognitive load, an implicit attitude would be a 
better predictor than explicit attitude, this was not the case. Both explicit and implicit attitudes 
were good predictors of preference. Yet unexpectedly, explicit attitude had a stronger 
relationship with preference than implicit attitude.  These results, in conjunction with those for 
H3a, H4a, and H5a, imply that a non-conscious goal prime may be mediated by implicit attitude, 
but not by explicit attitude. This result is consistent with Ferguson and Bargh (2004)’s argument 
                                                 
1
 *1: As we have predicted the direction of the effect of goal prime on preference, the p-value is 
computed as one-tailed. 
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that although an activation of goal would affect implicit attitude uniquely, that activation does 
not affect explicit attitude.  
3.6.7. Hypotheses 6b, 7 
 Similar to Study 1, mood was not a good predictor of either explicit attitude or preference, 
rejecting both H6b and H7. Again, this might be an indication that when a goal already exists 
(i.e., wholesome or decadent goals), an individual in a negative mood may not have an accessible 
goal toward improving the mood by favoring immediate rewards (e.g., eating tasty, decadent 
food) to long-term rewards (e.g., staying fit and healthy). Thus, the main effect of mood on 
preference or explicit attitude is due to a lack of self-control in a negative mood. 
3.6.8. Implication (Studies 1 & 2)  
 The results from Studies 1 and 2 indicate that the goal activation explanation was 
supported, rejecting the semantic-cue activation explanation. Also, interestingly, implicit attitude 
was a better mediator of the relationship between goal prime and preference than explicit attitude. 
These findings have important theoretical implications.  
The consistent goal priming effect on preference did not diminish over time, which 
means that the prime activated the goal, not just semantic cues, resulting in a preference 
consistent with goal prime. This is because the effect of semantic cue activation may decay 
quickly over time, whereas the effect of goal activation should not diminish until fulfilled. 
 Interestingly, the goal prime had a significant effect not only on preference, but also on 
implicit attitude. Then the implicit attitude had a positive, significant effect on preference. Thus, 
the effect of goal prime on preference was mediated by the implicit attitude. This is consistent 
with the theory of goal systems where goals and motivation are part of the cognitive systems 
rather than distinct from them. If the goal is not part of the cognitive systems, as other 
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researchers argue, the effect of goal prime on preference would not have been mediated by 
implicit attitude.    
 However, there was no effect of the goal prime on explicit attitude. As some studies 
indicate that goal activation has more impact on implicit attitude than on explicit attitude 
(Ferguson, 2008; Ferguson and Bargh, 2004), a consideration of explicit attitude alone may lead 
researchers to underestimate the effects of goal primes. The results of this study highlight the 
importance of including implicit attitude measures, such as the IAT, to capture the effect of goal 
prime on behavioral outcomes, such as brand preference.   
 The study also has an important methodological implication on the use of the IAT. 
Support for H8 indicates that the category combination has a significant effect on implicit 
attitude. This result is important when the direction of preference depends on the category 
combination; in this study, one category combination resulted in preference towards decadent 
brands, while the other category combination resulted in a preference for wholesome brands 
(M=.072 for combination 1 and M = -.547 for combination 2). If a researcher applies only one 
category combination, the results might be misinterpreted, which confirms the argument by 
Messner and Vosgerau (2010). 
3.6.9. General Discussion (Essay 2 & Essay 3)  
3.6.9.1. Introduction 
This dissertation has two primary purposes: (1) to understand how goal primes affect 
preference, and (2) to understand the moderators and mediators of the effect of goal prime on 
preference.  As Custers and Arts (2007) pointed out, we do not have a clear understanding of 
how goal primes affect behavioral outcomes. Chartland et al. (2008) and Sela and Shiv (2009) 
provided the latest attempt in marketing literature to understand such mechanisms. Closely 
following the goal manipulation method used in Chartland et al. (2008), we measured the direct 
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effects of goal prime on implicit attitude (IAT) and explicit attitude. As far as we know, this 
dissertation is the first attempt to measure implicit attitude (IAT) and explicit attitude as 
mediators of the relationship between goal prime and preference in a brand preference context.  
Also, research suggests that the goal prime facilitates a choice that is either consistent or 
inconsistent with goal prime (Laran, Janiszewski, and Cunha Jr., 2008). This dissertation 
confirms the latter finding by (1) identifying moderators of this relationship (i.e., mood and 
cognitive load) in the context of frugal vs. luxury brand preference; and (2) identifying context 
differences as other moderating factors (i.e., the context of luxury brand vs. frugal brand 
preference, vs. the context of wholesome vs. decadent brand preference).    
3.6.9.2. The Effect of Goal Prime on Preference  
Consumers have not always preferred brands consistent with the goal prime in the 
context of luxury vs. frugal brands (i.e., Essay 2). In Essay 2, the effect of goal prime on 
preference was moderated by mood and cognitive load. Also, in Essay 2, the effect of goal prime 
on preference was more pronounced under a high cognitive load and a positive mood.  
This finding is consistent with the MODE model, which suggests that one’s behavior is 
guided more by relatively automatic process under low opportunity (e.g., high cognitive load) 
than under high opportunity (e.g., low cognitive load) (Fazio, 1990). Thus, the effect of a non-
conscious goal prime on preference is more pronounced under a high cognitive load. Also, the 
interaction between mood and goal is explained by the goal approach tendency in a positive 
mood and the goal-avoidance tendency in a negative mood (Fishbach and Labroo, 2007).  
In Essay 3, however, consumers preferred brands consistent with the goal prime, 
regardless of mood, in the context of consuming wholesome vs. decadent brands. Although the 
interaction of mood and goal was not statistically significant, the effect of goal prime on 
preference was relatively more pronounced in a negative mood.   
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There are two potential explanations for the inconsistency between Essay 2 and Essay 3. 
One possibility is the difference in the context.  Laran, Janiszewski, and Cunha Jr. (2008) noted 
that the possibility of more prime-inconsistent behavior in uncommon behavioral contexts, rather 
than in common behavioral contexts. For student subjects, the context of consuming luxury vs. 
frugal brands in Essay 2 was more uncommon than that of consuming decadent vs. wholesome 
brands in Essay 3. For example, the purchase of luxury brands (e.g., BMW) may have been an 
uncommon behavioral context. Instead, the product categories used in Essay 3 were in more 
common behavioral contexts. Thus, the possibility of activating information inconsistent with the 
goal prime is more pronounced in Essay 2 than in Essay 3, leaving more room to be moderated 
by mood.     
Another explanation is the role of mood in goal-approach and goal-avoidance tendencies. 
“Certain negative emotions may encourage rather than discourage goal pursuit” (see Aarts, 
Custers, and Holland, 2007, p. 176). Although the interaction of mood and goal was not 
statistically significant, as seen in Figure 6, the effect of the goal prime on preference was 
slightly more pronounced in a negative mood than in positive mood. The finding that negative 
mood, instead of positive mood, encouraged goal pursuit in Essay 3, is consistent with the notion 
that negative mood has more complex effects than positive mood (Isen, 1984; Leith and 
Baumeister, 1996).   
3.6.9.3. The Mediating Role of Explicit Attitude and Implicit Attitude  
Both in Essay 2 and Essay 3, goal primes affected implicit attitude, but did not affect 
explicit attitude. In Essay 2, whereas the effect of goal prime on implicit attitude was moderated 
by mood and cognitive load, the effect of goal prime on explicit attitude had no effect on explicit 
attitude. In Essay 3 under a high load, the effect of goal prime on preference, as expected, was 
mediated by implicit attitude, but not by explicit attitude.   
104 
 
3.6.9.4. Goal Activation vs. Semantic Cue Activation 
In both Essay 2 and Essay 3, the data suggests that primes activate goals, rather than 
semantic cues. The goal activation explanation was supported by the maintained, and 
undiminished, goal prime effect on preference overtime. Consistent with the theory of goal 
systems, these results suggest that goal activation accompanies activation of goal-related cue 
activation. According to Kruglanski et al. (2002), “the cognitive properties of goal-systems set 
the constraints within which the motivational properties may express themselves.” Thus, 
Kruglanski et al. (2002) explains goal-systems as characterized by both cognitive and 
motivational properties. After all, goal activation and semantic cue activation may not conflict 
with each other. Goal activation may be initiated by semantic cue activation of goal related 
concepts (These concepts probably have no motivational property). As a result, semantic 
activation may lead to activation of the means needed to attain the goal.   
Research suggests that the effect of goals is better captured by implicit attitude rather 
than explicit attitude. If researchers investigate the impact of goal activation only on explicit 
attitude, researchers may be unable to fully capture the impact of goals on attitudes. The 
distinction between explicit and implicit attitude may be why some researchers consider 
motivational properties and cognitive properties to be two separate systems.  
From a managerial perspective, brands should be recognized as means to achieve goals. 
For instance, if an ad can activate a brand that is seen as instrumental to the goal, the brand 
activation may lead to goal activation. In that case, the goal may not diminish until the individual 
purchases the brand.   
3.6.9.5. The Role of Mood on Implicit/Explicit Attitude and Preference 
We have predicted that individuals in a negative mood (vs. a positive mood) lack self-
control, thus preferring either luxury brands (vs. frugal brands) or decadent brands (vs. 
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wholesome brands). Although this should result in the main effect of mood on preference, the 
main effect of mood on preference was not observed in these data. In Essay 2, mood was a 
moderator of the goal prime effect on preference. Under a high cognitive load, a positive mood 
facilitated goal-approach tendencies and a negative mood facilitated goal-avoidance tendencies. 
In Essay 3, preference was not affected by mood nor by the interaction between mood and the 
goal prime. However, the goal prime did have a main effect on preference. Thus, in Essay 2, the 
interaction between the goal prime and mood affected preference. In Essay 3 only the goal prime, 
not mood, had an effect on preference.  
Both in Essay 2 and Essay 3, the main effect of mood on preference, due to lack of self-
control, was not observed. As noted, an individual in a negative mood prioritizes immediate 
rewards (e.g., buying luxury brands to make himself/herself feel better) rather than long-term 
benefits (e.g., saving money by buying frugal brands), more so than an individual in a positive 
mood (Tice, Bratslavsky, and Baumeister, 2001). The current goal may be overridden by a new 
prime. This may illustrate a potentially powerful effect of goal primes on preference or other 
behavioral outcomes.  
3.6.9.6. Implication for the MODE Model    
The assumption of the MODE model that priming activates only strongly held attitudes 
has been questioned by researchers, who argue that all attitudes are activated automatically 
(Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980).  Our findings in Essay 2 and Essay 3 are consistent with this notion 
that the prime can activate both strong and weak attitudes automatically. In Essay 2, the effects 
of goal prime on both preference and implicit attitude were not moderated by materialism. 
However, they were moderated by cognitive load and mood. Whereas individuals with high 
materialism may have strongly held attitudes towards luxury vs. frugal brands, those with low 
materialism may have weakly held attitudes toward those brands. Thus, the goal prime 
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automatically activates an implicit attitude, regardless of materialism or the strength of implicit 
attitudes.  
In Essay 3, we used self-control (trait) only as a covariate. Therefore, we did not directly 
test whether the effect of goal prime on either preference or implicit attitude was moderated by 
trait or attitude strength. However, the goal prime had main effects on both preference and 
implicit attitudes.  Our findings from both Essay 2 and Essay 3 potentially indicate that the goal 
prime can automatically activate both strong and weak attitudes.              
3.6.10. Limitations and Future Research (Essay 2 & Essay 3) 
3.6.10.1. Issues with IAT 
Although the IAT is the most popular measure of implicit attitude today, some 
researchers raise issues with the IAT (e.g., Messner and Vosgerau, 2010; Jaccard and Blanton, 
2007).  Consistent with the findings of Messner and Vosgerau (2010), we discussed the effect of 
category combinations on IAT scores. Jaccard and Blanton (2007) questioned the assumptions 
underlying the IAT. One such assumption is that the IAT requires a comparison of attitudes 
towards two objects (i.e., relative attitudes), with bipolar relationships. However, this may not be 
true. In our study, we used wholesome vs. decadent, and frugal vs. luxury. We do not know if 
these two categories are conceptually bipolar. Researchers may be able to pretest the cognitive 
structure of potential categories by constructing a cognitive mapping. Another solution may be 
the use of a single category IAT (Steinman and Karpinski, 2008).    
Furthermore, the IAT is a relatively complicated task. Typically, the IAT has seven steps 
with ten to twenty brand names or words to categorize for each step; thus, there are about 120 
words to categorize in total. For some participants, this might present a tiring task that may 
induce a negative mood or increase cognitive load. Some researchers have developed a single 
category IAT (e.g., Steinman and Karpinski, 2008), which may be less susceptible to these 
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effects. Nevertheless, both formats should be empirically tested for validity and reliability (e.g., 
potential confounds with mood and cognitive load).  
3.6.10.2. Mood Manipulation 
As is always the challenge for mood research, mood is transient in nature. Thus, a mood 
induced at the beginning of a study may regress toward the mean toward the end of the study. In 
order to overcome this challenge, researchers may need to use multiple mood manipulations 
throughout the study, or measure mood constantly throughout the study by using some 
physiological measures (e.g., heart rate, skin temperature). Thus, it might be possible to account 
for the transient effects of mood on attitude and preference.    
Furthermore, in the mood manipulation, participants were asked to recall happy or 
unhappy events. Some happy events may induce more (or less) mood arousal than others. 
Although we have only measured the valence of mood, the arousal of mood may present another 
crucial dimension. Some research suggests that a positive mood with high arousal reduces self-
regulation (Fedorikhin and Patrick, 2008). Thus, it may be interesting to investigate the effect of 
both valence and arousal of mood on brand preference in the context of non-conscious goal 
activation.   
3.6.10.3. Stimulus (Brands)  
We have used brands in multiple product categories in measuring preference and 
implicit/explicit attitude.  This was partly because of a limited number of brands available in a 
single product category, containing both wholesome and decadent brands, or luxury and frugal 
brands. The IAT typically requires five or more brands in each category (wholesome and 
decadent, or luxury and frugal). It may be possible to use not only verbal information (i.e., brand 
name) but also visual information (i.e., pictures of brands) to minimize the number of brands 
108 
 
required. Further, combining both the verbal and visual stimulus in the IAT might increase the 
generalizability of the findings.  
3.6.10.4. Order Effects 
 Throughout the studies, we observed many types of order effects. First, the order of 
administering dependent measures (i.e., explicit attitude, implicit attitude, and preference) had 
some effects. This may be due to the transient nature of mood. Alternatively, some of the 
dependent measures themselves may have affected other measures. For instance, the IAT has 
many brands (e.g., frugal vs. luxury brands) within its measures. These brands might have 
triggered goals and affected either explicit attitude or preference. However, in view of an equal 
number of frugal and luxury brands, this consideration should not work as a serious confound in 
the study.  
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DETAILED PRETEST RESULTS: LUXURY BRAND NAMES 
 
Brand Name Luxury or Frugal* Familiarity Employed in Main 
Study? 
Saks Fifth Avenue 1.61 6.39 Yes 
Nordstrom 2.92 5.90 Yes 
Four Seasons 2.89 6.15 Yes 
Ritz-Carlton 1.27 6.68 Yes 
BMW 1.55 7.87 Yes 
Hyatt 3.69 6.15 Yes 
Armani 1.50 6.35 Yes 
Lexus 1.71 7.31 No 
Continental 4.81 6.24 No 
Hertz 5.40 6.06 No 
Avis 5.39 4.94 No 
Apple 2.65 7.55 No 
Bose 2.61 6.79 No 
Gucci 1.40 6.63 No 
Harvard 1.56 6.56 No 
Yale 1.56 6.45 No 
Delta 4.60 6.68 No 




DETAILED PRETEST RESULTS: FRUGAL BRAND NAMES 
 
Brand Name Luxury or Frugal Familiarity Employed in Main 
Study? 
Wal-Mart 7.68 8.61 Yes 
Dollar General 8.52 7.66 Yes 
Kia 7.11 5.97 Yes 
Motel 6 8.50 6.66 Yes 
Best Western 6.98 7.03 Yes 
Days Inn 7.52 6.73 Yes 
Hanes 6.39 7.60 Yes 
Southwest 6.16 6.68 No 
Budget 6.71 5.32 No 
Thrifty  7.21 5.76 No 
Hyundai 6.27 5.24 No 
Dell 4.55 7.71 No 
Panasonic 4.56 6.29 No 
Converse 6.11 6.23 No 
University of Phoenix 7.11 5.32 No 
Baton Rouge 
Community College 
7.53 6.15 No 
Air Tran 5.76 4.21 No 




SCALE ITEMS: MATERIALISM (GENERAL) 
 
1. It is important to me to have really nice things. 
2. I would like to be rich enough to buy anything I want. 
3. I'd better be happier if I could afford to buy more things. 
4. It sometimes bothers me quite a bit that I can't afford to buy all of the things I would like. 
5. People place too much emphasis on material things. 
6. It's really true that money can buy happiness. 




































Manipulated Variables: Goal Prime, Mood,  


































DETAILED PRETEST RESULTS: DECADENT BRAND NAMES 
 
 Decadent Wholesome Familiarity Positive Employed in 
Main Study? 
Ben & Jerry's 6.47 5.97 7.24 7.03 Yes 
Haagen-Dazs 6.26 5.59 5.76 6.06 Yes 
Godiva 6.06 5.24 5.71 6.24 Yes 
Snickers 6.03 5.94 8.35 7.32 Yes 
Pepperidge Farm 
Cookie 
5.59 5.88 6.50 6.65 Yes 
Wolfgang Puck 5.12 5.06 5.09 5.26 Yes 
Starbucks 6.47 6.15 8.24 6.85 Yes 
Coke 6.21 6.24 8.71 7.91 Yes 
Krispy Kreme 5.53 4.62 7.44 6.00 Yes 
Wonka 5.32 5.15 6.76 6.26 Yes 
Dove-Chocolate 6.24 5.97 7.26 6.82 No 
Twix 6.06 5.65 7.82 7.41 No 
Ghirardelli 5.97 5.21 5.53 6.21 No 
A1Steaksauce 5.82 6.53 7.94 6.71 No 
Oreo 5.71 5.85 8.09 7.26 No 
Pepsi 5.71 5.94 8.47 7.32 No 
Swissmiss 5.65 5.94 6.15 6.24 No 
Kit Kat 5.50 5.59 8.06 7.09 No 
Chips Ahoy 5.47 5.97 8.03 7.35 No 
Doritos 5.44 6.18 8.24 7.65 No 
Starburst 5.41 5.44 7.82 7.00 No 
Frito-Lay 5.38 5.76 7.91 7.38 No 
DiGiorno 5.12 5.85 6.59 6.44 No 
Heineken 5.06 5.00 7.06 5.26 No 
Sprite 5.06 5.85 8.26 7.12 No 
Kendall-Jackson 4.91 4.82 2.91 4.88 No 
Pringles 4.91 5.62 7.59 7.06 No 
Coffee-Mate 4.88 5.32 6.74 6.18 No 
McDonald's 4.82 4.65 8.47 6.88 No 
California Pizza 
Kitchen 
4.79 5.53 4.32 5.59 No 
Café Du Monde 4.76 4.82 2.74 5.00 No 
Texas De Brazil 4.62 4.65 2.97 4.71 No 
Seattle's Best 4.56 4.94 3.74 5.18 No 
Nescafe 4.56 5.35 4.79 5.09 No 






DETAILED PRETEST RESULTS: WHOLESOME BRAND NAMES 
 
 Wholesome Decadent Familiarity Positive Employed 
in Main 
Study? 
Dannon 6.89 5.36 7.18 7.00 Yes 
Yoplait 6.71 5.36 6.86 7.00 Yes 
Cheerios 7.71 5.25 7.96 7.64 Yes 
Quaker Oats 7.29 4.89 7.50 7.32 Yes 
Fiber One 6.68 5.18 5.96 5.61 Yes 
Healthy choice 6.89 5.36 6.54 6.36 Yes 
V8 7.64 5.79 7.64 7.04 Yes 
Dole 6.93 5.57 7.46 7.25 Yes 
Kashi 6.61 4.93 5.04 5.68 Yes 
Special K 7.54 5.86 7.39 7.25 Yes 
Nature valley 7.43 5.43 6.89 7.21 No 
Planters peanuts 6.86 5.25 7.61 7.61 No 
Sun-Maidraisins 6.75 5.00 7.11 6.75 No 
Tropicana 6.75 5.46 7.61 7.46 No 
Yoplait 6.71 5.36 6.86 7.00 No 
Fiberone 6.68 5.18 5.96 5.61 No 
Welch'S 6.68 5.14 7.79 6.96 No 
Kashi 6.61 4.93 5.04 5.68 No 
Oceanspray 6.61 5.11 7.07 6.75 No 
Prego 6.57 5.32 7.50 7.00 No 
Minutemaid 6.57 5.82 7.75 7.14 No 
Heinz 6.46 5.36 8.14 7.43 No 
Eggland's Best 6.39 5.25 4.61 5.29 No 
Pillsbury 6.36 5.29 7.93 7.64 No 
Bisquick 6.21 4.75 7.39 7.00 No 
Olive-Garden 6.11 5.96 7.79 7.54 No 
Delmonte 6.04 5.64 5.18 5.86 No 
Weightwatchers 5.89 4.39 6.57 5.43 No 
Craisins 5.89 4.64 5.04 5.43 No 
Saralee 5.86 5.79 7.21 6.96 No 
Smucker'S 5.75 5.14 7.21 6.86 No 
Nakedjuice 5.75 5.29 3.71 5.68 No 
Sunbeambread 5.64 4.96 4.14 5.14 No 
Birdseye 5.54 5.14 4.00 5.36 No 






SCALE ITEMS: SELF-CONTROL 
 
1. I am good at resisting temptation. 
2. I have a hard time breaking bad habits. (R) 
3. I am lazy. (R) 
4. I say inappropriate things. (R) 
5. I do certain things that are bad for me, if they are fun. (R) 
6. I refuse things that are bad for me. 
7. I wish I had more self-discipline. (R) 
8. People would say that I have iron self- discipline. 
9. Pleasure and fun sometimes keep me from getting work done. (R) 
10. I have trouble concentrating. (R) 
11. I am able to work effectively toward long-term goals. 
12. Sometimes I can’t stop myself from doing something, even if I know it is wrong. (R) 
13. I often act without thinking through all the alternatives. (R) 





Nobuyuki Fukawa is an assistant professor of marketing in the Department of Business 
and Information Technology at Missouri University of Science and Technology. He earned his 
bachelor of art degree in business from Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, Japan, and a Master of 
Marketing Research from University of Georgia as a Coca-Cola Foundation Scholar. 
Hitotsubashi University awarded him with a one-year study program opportunity at the 
University of California, Riverside, in 1998. He also received The Daryl McKee Doctoral Study 
Memorial Award from LSU Marketing Department in 2009.  
His research interest lies in the area of hedonic memory processes (e.g., affect, 
imagination) and their effects on consumer behavior, brand equity, advertising, and marketing 
strategy. His research has been published in various journals, including the Journal of 
Advertising, Industrial Marketing Management, and Marketing Management Journal. His 
research is also published as a book chapter of Supply Chain. He has presented his research at 
various conferences, including the Academy of Marketing Science and the Advertising & 
Consumer Psychology Conference. His interest is in teaching the principle of marketing, 
marketing strategy, and consumer behavior. Prior to his academic career, he worked in sales and 
marketing for five years at Dell Japan and Coca-Cola Company (Japan). 
    The degree of Doctor of Philosophy will be conferred on Mr. Fukawa at the December, 
2010 Commencement.  
 
 
